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ABSTRACT
The recent advancements of multimedia signal processing techniques enable us to
conveniently edit/modify multimedia contents, which are usually available in the com-
pressed form for transmission and storage purposes. Among the compression standards,
JPEG for still image and H.264/AVC for video are the common formats that we han-
dle in our daily life. As the application of compressed image/video widens, practical
security tools for compressed image/video also become increasingly important. In that
regard, encryption is the process designed to transform a content into an unintelligible
form. Classical encryption approaches (e.g., DES, AES, RSA) handle the bitstream of a
compressed image/video directly, but this approach invalidates many features of the com-
pressed image/video, including hierarchical decoding and transcoding. In addition, the
computational time of conventional encryption is also high. To overcome the aforemen-
tioned problems, the selective-encryption approach, which encrypts a subset of a com-
pressed content, has been pursued by many researchers. Although many were proven to
be robust against traditional cryptanalysis, the conventional selective-encryption methods
are vulnerable to non-traditional forms of attack called sketch attack. In this thesis, five
sketch attacks, i.e., four of them are based on DCT coefficients while another one exploits
the statistical features of a coding block, are proposed. Their performances are evaluated
and then compared. Furthermore, as a mean to evaluate the sketch image, an objective
evaluation metric called outline clearness assessment (OCA) is put forward. Moreover,
a selective encryption method for JPEG compressed image is put forward to address the
problem of bitstream size overhead while being robust against both the traditional and
non-traditional attacks. As an application, sketch attack is utilized as a feature extraction
process in H.264/AVC compressed video for text detection purpose. Finally, contribu-
tions and limitations of this study are summarized, and future works are discussed.
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ABSTRAK
Kemajuan kebelakangan ini dalam teknik pemprosesan isyarat multimedia memu-
dahkan kita untuk mengubasuai/menyunting kandungan multimedia, yang biasanya di-
dapati dalam bentuk termampat bagi tujuan penghantaran dan penyimpanan. Antara
piawaian-piawaian mampatan, JPEG untuk imej and H.264/AVC untuk video adalah an-
tara piawaian biasa yang kita menangani dalam kehidupan seharian. Sementara apli-
kasi imej/video termampat makin melebar, alat-alat keselamatan yang praktikal untuk
imej/video termampat juga menjadi semakin penting. Sehubungan itu, penyulitan adalah
proses yang direka untuk mengubah kandungan kepada bentuk yang tidak boleh difahami.
Teknik-teknik penyulitan klasikal (contohnya, DES, AES, RSA) mengendalikan urutan
bit daripada imej/video termampat secara langsung, tetapi teknik-teknik ini membatalkan
banyak ciri-ciri imej/video termampat, termasuk penyahkodan hierarki dan transpenge-
kodan. Di samping itu, kos pemprocessan penyulitan konvensional juga tinggi. Bagi
mengatasi masalah-masalah yang dinyatakan di atas, teknik penyulitan selektif, yang me-
nyulitkan subset kandungan termampat, telah diusahakan oleh para penyelidik. Walau-
pun banyak teknik tersebut telah dibukti kukuh terhadap kriptanalisis tradisional, teknik-
teknik penyulitan selektif konvensional adalah lemah terhadap serangan bukan tradisional
yang dipanggil Sketch Attack. Dalam tesis ini, lima Sketch Attack, iaitu, empat daripada
mereka adalah berdasarkan pekali DCT manakala satu lagi mengeksploitasikan ciri-ciri
statistik blok pengekod, telah dicadangkan. Pencapaian mereka telah dinilai dan diban-
ding. Selain itu, sebagai cara untuk menilai Sketch Attack, objektif penilaian metrik yang
dikenali sebagai Outline Clearness Assessment (OCA) telah dicadangkan. Di samping
itu, kaedah penyulitan selektif untuk imej termampat dalam piawaian JPEG telah dica-
dangkan untuk menangani masalah perkembangan saiz urutan bit pada masa yang sama
kukuh terhadap kedua-dua serangan tradisional dan bukan tradisional. Sebagai aplikasi,
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Sketch Attack digunakan sebagai proses pengekstrakan ciri-ciri dari video termampat da-
lam piawaian H.264/AVC untuk tujuan pengesanan teks. Akhir sekali, sumbangan dan
kekurangan kajian ini diringkaskan, dan kerja-kerja masa depan dibincangkan.
v
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
An introduction of this study is presented in this chapter. It includes the overview of fea-
ture extraction, problem statements, aims and objectives, research methodology, scopes
and limitations, and contributions, under the general topic of feature extraction in the
compressed domain.
1.2 Overview on Feature Extraction in the Compressed Domain
The recent growth of computer networks and the advent of affordable devices enable us to
utilize multimedia sharing services, Social Network Service (SNS) (e.g., Facebook, Twit-
ter and Instagram), Video on Demand (VOD) (e.g., Netflix), Video Sharing Service (VSS)
(e.g., Youtube), Video Conferencing (VC) (e.g., Google Hangouts), Video Advertisement
(VA), Surveillance System (SS), etc. As a result, various digital image/video contents,
including high-resolution images and High Definition (HD) videos, started to play cru-
cial roles in our daily life. Generally, these images/videos are stored in widely deployed
compression standards, namely, JPEG or H.264/AVC. Therefore, practical security tools
for compressed images/videos become important.
In the literature, there is a practical class of encryption methods, namely, format-
compliant selective encryption, which is satisfying both conventional cryptanalysis at-
tacks and perceptual attacks. However, Li, et at. (W. Li & Yuan, 2007) put forward a
new class of perceptual attack, which utilizes a primitive signal processing operation,
where a set of coarse outlines can be obtained directly from the bitstream of an image
encrypted in JPEG compressed domain. Since block-transform is one of the core parts
in both JPEG and H.264/AVC, a simple single feature extraction is viable to sketch an
outline of the encrypted images/videos, which are perceptually degraded by conventional
1
format-compliant selective encryption methods detailed in Chapter 2. However, this re-
search direction has not been explored much. Literature survey performed during this
study reveals that Li et al. (W. Li & Yuan, 2007) is the only work that sketches outline
directly from the encrypted image. Hence, there is much room to design this class fea-
ture extractions for JPEG and H.264/AVC. Hereinafter, this class of feature extraction
techniques and the extracted features are referred to as sketch attacks and sketch images,
respectively.
In addition, Li et al. (W. Li & Yuan, 2007) evaluated the sketch images by referring
to an edge image obtained from the original image/video. However, the original image
cannot be obtained when only encrypted images/videos are considered, which is usually
the case. An intuitive alternative assessment is to perform subjective evaluation by hu-
mans. Such subjective evaluations are not only slow, cumbersome, time-consuming but
also expensive. Hence, assessment is also one of the challenging problems in feature
extraction in the compressed domain.
Furthermore, other applications in the compressed domain, including text detec-
tion (X. Qian et al., 2012) and human action recognition (Tom et al., 2015), have been
put forward recently. This fact suggests that researchers have given some attentions to
the compressed domain, where sketch images obtained by sketch attacks may be useful
for applications based on feature extraction in the compressed domain. Therefore, the
demonstration of applications by using sketch images is significant for the investigation
into feature extraction in the compressed domain. In that regards, encryption for block-
transform compressed images and text detection in compressed videos are demonstrated
in this study.
2
1.3 Problem Statements
As pointed out in the overview above, there are some problems to be solved. Exist-
ing format-compliant selective encryption may not be robust to sketch attack (W. Li &
Yuan, 2007) and there are many opportunities to design sketch attacks, because there
are many unprocessed components, such as coefficient category, coefficient energy, co-
efficient distribution, allocated bits to Macro Block (MB), etc., in block-transform based
compression, e.g., JPEG and H.264/AVC.
In addition, Li et al. (W. Li & Yuan, 2007) considered only binary information for
sketch image assessment, and manual thresholding is required. The utilization of the orig-
inal image is also impractical because the plaintext image is usually unavailable. Hence,
no-reference assessment for sketch images is desired.
Furthermore, features in the compressed domain have been exploited not only for
the purpose of attacking encryption methods (W. Li & Yuan, 2007), but also for other
applications (X. Qian et al., 2012; Tom et al., 2015). However, even the latest study
of the feature extractions and its related applications in the compressed domain are still
immature, because Qian et al. (X. Qian et al., 2012) only verified the performance of text
detection for graphic text in INTRA- (I-)frame of H.264/AVC compressed video, while a
compressed video is, by far, dominated by Predictive- (P-) or Bi-Predictive- (B-)frames.
On the other hand, although Tom et al. (Tom et al., 2015) utilized Quality Parameter (QP)
and Motion Vector (MV) as features for human action recognition, there are still many
unexplored features within the H.264/AVC standard.
Based on the descriptions above, the current problems in the compressed domain are
summarized as follows:
1. Existing format-compliant selective encryption may not be robust against sketch
attack.
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2. There is still much room for improvement in designing sketch attack for JPEG
images and H.264/AVC videos.
3. The literature is lacking of no-reference assessment of sketch/outline images.
4. The limited scope of exploration for feature extraction in the compressed domain.
1.4 Aims and Objectives
This study aims at investigating into feature extractions in the compressed domain for
purposes of managing digital images/videos. To achieve this goal, this study aims to
achieve the following objectives:
1. To conduct a comprehensive survey of feature extraction in the compressed domain;
2. To develop novel sketch attacks for encrypted image and video;
3. To develop a no-reference assessment metric for sketch image;
4. To develop a robust format-compliant selective encryption framework;
5. To evaluate the newly proposed sketch attacks and encryption technique, and;
6. To develop a text detection in the compressed domain as an application of sketch
attack.
1.5 Research Methodology
To achieve these objectives, the following five-step methodology is considered in this the-
sis, including: literature survey; sketch attacks for format-compliant selectively encrypted
video; outline clearness assessment; format-compliant selective encryption framework
for block-transform compressed image, and text detection in H.264/AVC compressed
video. First, literature survey is conducted to study the components of JPEG image and
H.264/AVC video, and encryption. Next, the problems related to feature extraction in
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the compressed domain and the research objectives are identified. Then, sketch attacks
for video encrypted by using format-compliant selective encryption techniques are pro-
posed and evaluated. Furthermore, a no-reference outline clearness assessment metric is
proposed for giving objective scores to sketch images. Moreover, a format-compliant se-
lective encryption framework is put forward to address the current encryption problems.
Finally, text detection using sketch attack in the compressed domain is demonstrated as
one possible applications.
1.6 Scopes and Limitations
The scope and limitations of this study need to be addressed concisely in order to layout
an achievable research plan and proceed according to schedule for achieving the research
objectives. The scopes and the limitations are as follows:
1. The target contents in this study are limited to block-transform compressed im-
ages/videos, considering the state-of-the-art compression standards, namely, JPEG
and H.264/AVC.
2. This study considers both non-encrypted (i.e., plaintext) contents and encrypted
contents attained by format-compliant selective encryption methods, which can
flexibly generate images/videos of desired levels of distortion.
3. International Standard Organization and International Telecommunication Union
(ISO/ITU) reference software under C programming language are utilized to gen-
erate compressed as well as compressed-encrypted images and videos.
1.7 Contributions
This study has complied with comprehensive works, which are translated to the contribu-
tions below:
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1. Novel sketch attacks are designed to generate sketch images directly from both
INTRA- and INTER-frames of compressed-only as well as compressed-encrypted
videos.
2. A clearness assessment metric for outline images (sketch images and edge images)
is formulated.
3. A novel format-compliant selective encryption framework for block-transform com-
pressed images is put forward to achieve encryption, which is robust against both
traditional cryptanalyses as well as sketch attacks.
4. A text detection method is proposed to demonstrate the viability of sketch image
in other domain, in addition to its ability in attacking format-compliant encryption
methods.
1.8 Structure of Thesis
This thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, commonly utilized block-transform
compression image/video standards, conventional format-compliant selective encryption
methods, attacking methods (viz., cryptographic attacks, perceptual attacks and a sketch
attack) and a conventional sketch image assessment metric in the literature are surveyed.
Then, the problem of feature extraction directly from encrypted images/videos is detailed.
In Chapter 3, a novel feature extraction method and a sketch attack framework are pro-
posed. To evaluate sketched images, a non-reference outline assessment metric is pro-
posed to evaluate the quality of the sketch and edge images in Chapter 4. To overcome
sketch attack, a novel scrambling framework for block-transform compressed images is
proposed in Chapter 5. The viability of the extracted features in other applications is
further investigated, where, text detection in the compressed domain is demonstrated in
Chapter 6. Finally, in Chapter 7, the conclusions and future directions of this study are
6
discussed.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE SURVEY
2.1 Overview
In this chapter, literature related to feature extraction in the compressed domain is overviewed
as following topics: compression standards for still image and video; format-compliant
encryption; sketch attack; quality assessment, and; applications in the compressed do-
main. Specifically, the components of two compression standards, i.e., JPEG and H.264/AVC,
are scrutinized. Then, format-compliant selective encryption methods for images/videos
and attacking methods are described. Next, a conventional sketch attack is reviewed, fol-
lowed by an overview of sketch image quality assessment for edge image. In addition,
an overview of text detection in the spatial domain and the compressed domain are also
presented. Finally, the problems in the surveyed literature are identified and discussed.
2.2 Overview of block-transform Compression Standards
In this study, two widely deployed compression standards are considered throughout this
study, namely, JPEG and H.264/AVC.
2.2.1 JPEG
In spite of the fact that JPEG (ISO/IEC, 1994) compression was standardized a few
decades ago, the format is adopted in most of the decoders, which are included in digital
devices (such as smartphone, laptop), and the format is utilized as a still compressed im-
age file format in digital cameras. Hence, the number of images sorted in JPEG format is
huge.
Figure 2.1 shows the main components in the JPEG compression standard. First,
the level shift operation is applied to the intensity values of the original image to shift
them by −128, and then the output is converted from Red-Green-Blue (RGB) to Lumi-
nance, Chroma-Blue Chroma-Red (YCbCr) (i.e., color conversion operation). Here, the
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Figure 2.1: Process flow for JPEG compression (encoding phase)
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Figure 2.2: An example of forming ZRV using Zigzag scan (ISO/IEC, 1994)
resolution of the channels (i.e., Cb and Cr) of chrominance optionally can be reduced
(sub-sampled) to achieve more compression efficiency. Next, non-overlapping blocks
(i.e., 8×8 pixels) are obtained by partitioning each the (sub-sampled) channel to conduct
block-based operations. Each the block is transformed by Discrete Cosine Transform
(DCT) (K.R.Rao & P.Yip, 1990) to obtain coefficients in the frequency domain, where
low-frequency coefficient values are generally perceptive to human eyes, and verse visa.
Since high frequency coefficients are less perceptual to human eye, quantization opera-
tion, which utilizes a table referred as Quantization Table (QT) determined by the Quality
Factor (QF), is applied to the obtained coefficients of each block for further removing
redundancy of the coefficients. Then, the quantized Direct Current (DC) coefficient un-
dergoes Differential Pulse Code Modulation (DPCM) based prediction while the Zigzag
scan is applied to the quantized Alternating Current (AC) coefficients for forming Valu-
able Length Coding (VLC). Figure 2.2 illustrates an example of forming ZRV using the
Zigzag scan. Finally, the outputs of them are entropy coded using VLC such as Huffman
coding.
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Figure 2.3: A flow of H.264/AVC encoder (Wiegand et al., 2003)
2.2.2 H.264/AVC
A general video encoder transforms a video formed with a sequence of frames into a
compressed video bitstream. Figure 2.3 shows the flow of a general H.264/AVC en-
coder (Wiegand et al., 2003). H.264/AVC encoder selects an encoding frame mode (either
I-, P- or B- frame mode) for each input frame according to the frame sequence. Next, The
frames are partitioned into non-overlapping MBs, which are 16×16 pixel blocks. Then,
each MB is encoded following its encoding frame mode. Specifically, I-frame MBs are
encoded without any reference MBs, while P-frame MBs are encoded with or without
reference (I- or P-frame preceding the current frame) MBs. In encoding B-frame MBs,
the encoding process is similar to the process of P-frame MBs, but the encoding refers
not only preceding I- or P-frame, but also I- or P-frames following the current frame.
More specifically, each MB in I-frame is further partitioned into blocks, which are
either sixteen 4×4 pixel blocks, four 8×8, or one 16×16, are considered to refer its spa-
tial complexity and then the partitioned MB information is recoded as MB Type (MBT).
To reduce spatial redundancy, the pixel values of the MB are predicted from same frame
neighbor blocks, namely North-East (NE), North (N), North-West (NW), and/or West
(W) neighbors. Each direction information in used for prediction is recorded in INTRA
Prediction Mode (INTRA-M). Then, the predicted values of each block are transformed
with Integer Discrete Cosine Transform (IntDCT) and then quantized with QP. By using
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either Context Adaptive Valuable Length Coding (CAVLC) or Context Adaptive Binary
Arithmetic Coding (CABAC), the output of the aforementioned operations is entropy
coded.
On the other hand, in encoding each MB of P- or B-frame, each MB is further parti-
tioned into various size blocks, i.e., 4×4, 8×4, 8×8, 8×16, 16×8 or 16×16 according
to the result of the quarter-pixel MV estimation is operated using single/multiple refer-
ence frames. Here, prior to motion estimation, in-loop Deblocking Filter (DF) is utilized
for mitigating blocking noise, which is an intrinsic drawback of any block-transform com-
pression approach. Next, the predicted values of each block are calculated, and entropy
coded. Information of the output values and the information of the process modes are
coded as H.264/AVC syntax.
H.264/AVC supports various Network Abstract Layer Unit (NALU) to carry the
header information for transport layer or storage media as H.264/AVC syntax. These
units include sequence parameter set that contains the input video parameters, picture pa-
rameter set that contains frame parameters, instantaneous decoder refresh that signals the
reference frame buffer to be cleared, and several slices. As for slice level, each slice con-
tains slice header and slice data, namely, end of sequence indicating the end of a frame
and end of the stream indicating the end point of the sequence. Each H.264/AVC syntax
can be placed into a logical data packet.
2.2.3 Symbols in the block-transform Domain
To avoid loss of generality in this thesis, an input g (an image or a frame of video) of
dimension X ×Y pixels is assumed. g(x,y) indicates the (x,y)-th pixel value in the input g.
In the compressed domain, generally, pre-processing (e.g., prediction process) is operated
on the input g, and then the block transformed values T is obtained by using a block
transformation with block size γ × γ pixels, where γ = 4 or 8. To gain compression, the
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Table 2.1: Components Stored in the Bitstream of Compressed Image/Video
Standard MBT MV PM Coefficient QC EC BPH
JPEG × × × X X X X
H.264/AVC X X X X X X X
transformed values T are quantized. Hence, the (u,v)-th transformed value Tu,v(i, j) in
the (i, j)-th γ× γ block in T can be denoted as follows:
Tu,v(i, j) = constant×Fu,v(i, j)×QT [u][v], (2.1)
where i∈ [1,M], j∈ [1,N], u,v∈ [1,γ], γ M = X , γ N = Y , constant is a constant value,
Fu,v(i, j) is the (u,v)-th transformed and quantized value in the (i, j)-th γ× γ block in T,
and QT [u][v] is the (u,v)-th quantization table.
2.2.4 Components Stored in Compressed Image/Video
Bitstream of a compressed image/video contains various components / information, which
can be categorized as follows: (A) MBT information, which indicates the size of MB for
H.264/AVC; (B) MV information, which includes Differential Motion Vector (DMV) in
H.264/AVC; (C) Prediction Mode (PM) mode information which includes INTRA-M and
INTER Prediction Mode (INTER-M) in H.264/AVC; (D) Coefficient information, which
includes the sign of DCT and its magnitude value; (E) Quality Control Parameter (QC)
information, which includes QF in JPEG or QP, bitrate, and DF in H.264/AVC; (F) En-
tropy Code (EC), which includes VLC in JPEG, and CAVLC or CABAC in H.264/AVC,
and; (G) Bitstream Packet Header (BPH) information, which includes group of picture,
resolution, and NALU information. Table 2.1 summarizes the aforementioned compo-
nents/information encoded within a compressed image/video bitstream. Here, if the box
of row α and column β is marked withX, it signifies that standard α includes component
β in compressed bitstream, and × signifies otherwise.
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2.3 Overview of Encryption
As the demand for high-resolution images and HD videos increases, practical security
tools also become significantly important for JPEG compressed image and H.264/AVC
compressed video. In image/video compressed content, perceptual information quality
is one of significant property. To handle the property in perceptual encryption, Thomas
et al. (Stutz & Uhl, 2012) formalized transparent encryption, which is able to control
the perceptual quality of a video. In addition, this perceptual quality control ability is
practical for applications, such as VOD, VSS, VC, VA, SS. The reason is that desired
distortion videos can be flexibly generated by the content provider without revealing the
high-quality content before transmission to potential purchasers.
Along with the emergence of advanced compression techniques as well as their ap-
plications, the rate at which compressed images/videos are generated is increased, and
the demand security tool is also increased. Applying a classic cipher, i.e., Data Encryp-
tion Standard (DES), Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) or Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
(RSA), to the bitstream of a compressed image/video is an intuitive security tool. How-
ever, this class of approaches is too complex and fails various applications requirements.
To overcome the classic cipher problems, a number of image/video encryption algorithms
and their classifications (Socek et al., 2007; Massoudi et al., 2008; Stutz & Uhl, 2012;
Padilla-López et al., 2015) have been proposed. The interpretation and classification
might vary from one author to another. To avoid misinterpretation, three classifications
are defined in this thesis.
The first class is the term of selected target for encryption: Full encryption (T1),
which operates on the entire bitstream, and; Selective encryption (T2), which operates
on selected bits of the bitstream. Next, the second class necessitates the algorithm to
be format-compliance (Jiangtao et al., 2002) (transparency (Pazarci & Dipcin, 2002),
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or syntax-awareness (H. Li & Jian Ren, 2007)). Here, Format-compliant (F1) refers
to the case where the general decoder can decode the encrypted images/videos, and;
Non format-compliant (F2) refers that a general decoder can’t decode the encrypted im-
ages/videos. The third class is in terms of encryption domain: Uncompressed domain
(D1), which means that encryption is operated before compression process; Compressed
domain (D2), which means that encryption is operated jointly with compression process,
and; Bitstream domain (D3), which means that encryption handles encoded bitstream
directly.
Most of the conventional encryption methods (Massoudi et al., 2008; Stutz & Uhl,
2012) meet to both of Class T1 and Class F1 in the literature. I refer them as the term
format-compliant selective encryption in this thesis. In addition, in Class D1, the im-
age/video is encrypted before compression processing. However, it is intuitively expected
that the class compromises the compression performance. The reason is that encryption
introduces randomness, which makes difficult to exploit redundancy by compression op-
erations. Furthermore, Class D2 encrypts the components, such as sign information, in-
teger transformed coefficients and scanning order, in the image/video compression stan-
dard. Moreover, Class D3 encrypts the encoded bitstream, but this class can encrypt only
limited bits, e.g., packet body in Joint Picture Expert Group 2000 (JPEG2000) and reg-
ular units of network abstraction layer units in H.264/AVC. Therefore, Class D2 is the
promising approach to achieve the aforementioned advanced application scenarios. This
study focuses on format-compliant selective encryption of Class D2. The diagram of the
aforementioned classification can be illustrated in Figure 2.4.
2.3.1 Format-Compliant Selective Encryption for JPEG
In the literature, seven elementary encryption modules, which handle the components
in JPEG, have been considered to design format-compliant selective encryption. Con-
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Figure 2.4: Classification of image/video encryption classes (Socek et al., 2007; Mas-
soudi et al., 2008; Stutz & Uhl, 2012; Padilla-López et al., 2015)
ventional methods selectively considered these elementary modules. In the following
sub-sections, each the module is briefly described.
2.3.1.1 DC Shuffling (DCS)
DCS (W. Zeng & Lei, 2003) shuffles DC coefficients within the window of a certain size.
The module is able to control the outline quality of the distorted image, but it causes
bitstream size overhead.
2.3.1.2 DC Error Mapping (DCEM)
DCEM (Niu et al., 2008) maps each DC residue value processed by DPCM to a different
value, which belongs to the same code category. Although this module can maintain the
bitstream size, it cannot withstand the sketch attack (W. Li & Yuan, 2007).
2.3.1.3 DC Sign Randomization (DCSR)
DCSR (Shiguo et al., 2004) randomly flips the sign of DC coefficients.
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2.3.1.4 AC Sign Randomization (ACSR)
Each sign of AC coefficient is randomly flipped by ACSR (Lian et al., 2007). Since the
sign information is coded as one bit, ACSR can maintain the bitstream size. However, the
output of ACSR fails to withstand the sketch attack (W. Li & Yuan, 2007).
2.3.1.5 AC Subband Shuffling (ACSS)
The sequence of the AC coefficients is rearranged by ACSS F′u,v(i, j) (W. Li & Yuan,
2007; Shiguo et al., 2004). Let F′u,v(i, j) denote the shuffled (u,v)-th transformed coeffi-
cient of the (i, j)-th γ×γ block in T. This module conducted within in the same frequency
band can be expressed as Equation (2.2):
F
′
u,v(i, j) = Fu,v(i′, j′), (2.2)
and this module conducted within the same block can be expressed as Equation (2.3):
F
′
u,v(i, j) = Fu′,v′(i, j), (2.3)
where each symbol is defined as follows: 1 ≤ i,i′≤ M; 1 ≤ j, j′ ≤ N, and; 1 ≤ u,v,u′,v′
≤ 8. Although, by shuffling with Equation (2.2) and Equation (2.3), sufficient-distortion
images can be obtained, the bitstream size of the output severely increases (e.g., +∼ 20%
in Reference (W. Li & Yuan, 2007). Note that Equation (2.2) can withstand sketch attacks,
while Equation (2.3) fails.
2.3.1.6 AC ZRV Pair Scrambling (ACPS)
ACPS (Takayama et al., 2006; Wong & Tanaka, 2010) shuffles the order of Zero-Run
Value (ZRV) pairs, and there are two approaches: INTRA-block shuffling, and; INTER-
block shuffling. In INTER-block shuffling approach (Wong & Tanaka, 2010), all ZRV
pairs are extracted from the image, and then they are shuffled and distributed to each
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block. Although INTER-block shuffling approach can achieve sufficient distortion for
encryption, extra information, (namely, the number of nonzero coefficients of each block)
is required for the restoration operations. On the other hand, in INTRA-block shuffling
approach (Takayama et al., 2006), all ZRV pairs within each block are shuffled. This
approach doesn’t require extra information but is vulnerable to sketch attack.
2.3.1.7 AC Block Shuffling (ACBS)
ACBS (Takayama et al., 2006) permutes AC coefficient blocks within a window of a
certain size. Let FAC(i, j) denote the (i, j)-th AC block, i.e., the (i, j)-th block F(i, j) in T
without the DC coefficient. ACBS can be expressed by Equation (2.5):
F
′
AC(i, j) = FAC(i′, j′), (2.4)
This approach sufficiently distorts the input image and withstand against the sketch at-
tack (W. Li & Yuan, 2007), because the edge information is shuffled on the entire im-
age. In addition, this approach causes insignificant bitstream size overhead due to byte-
alignment (B.Pennebaker & L.Mitchell, 1992). However, ACBS is insufficient because
the outline image of the original image can be revealed from the intact DC coefficients.
2.3.1.8 Block Shuffling (BS)
BS (Niu et al., 2008) permutes DCT coefficient blocks as expressed by Equation (2.5)
within a window of a certain size:
F
′
(i, j) = F(i′, j′), (2.5)
where F′(i, j) denotes the shuffled (i, j)-th block inT. Since the order of blocks is shuffled
to transform texture/edge information to unintelligible form, BS can sufficiently distort
the image quality and withstand sketch attack (W. Li & Yuan, 2007). Note that, this
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module changes bitstream size due to byte-alignment (B.Pennebaker & L.Mitchell, 1992).
2.3.1.9 Coefficient Value Mapping (CVM)
CVM alters a DCT coefficient value regardless nonzero and zero coefficient value. Ref-
erence (M. Zhang & Tong, 2014) put forward an encryption method using a chaotic map,
which alters all partially decoded DCT coefficient values of each color channel to dif-
ferent values. In other words, this approach maps all DC and AC coefficient values to
different values. Similarly, Takayama et al. (Takayama et al., 2008) proposed a bijec-
tively mapping method that maps each AC coefficient to a different value. This approach
uses a parameter to generate a bijective map. Although these approaches achieve signif-
icant distortion by changing the magnitude of the coefficient values, the process causes
severe bitstream size overhead.
The aforementioned modules are selectively included in the conventional encryption
methods, which are summarized in Table 2.2. Note that, when the row α and the column
β is marked with X, the method at the row α includes the module at the column β . On
the other hand, when α and the column β is marked with ×, the method at the row α
doesn’t include the module at the column β .
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2.3.2 Format-Compliant Selective Encryption for H.264/AVC video
In H.264/AVC compressed video encryption, nine elementary modules handling the com-
pressed video components are considered in the literature (Stutz & Uhl, 2012). These el-
ementary modules were selectively considered to design desired effects for conventional
format-compliant selective encryption methods. In the following sub-sections, each ele-
mentary module is briefly described.
2.3.2.1 IntDCT Coefficient Sign Randomization (S)
S (Shiguo et al., 2006) operates sign flipping, which modifies the sign (i.e., plus or minus)
of each coefficient with a pseudo-random sequence. This module maintains the bitstream
size of the output encoded with CAVLC.
2.3.2.2 IntDCT Coefficient Level Modification (L)
L (Magli et al., 2006) maps the nonzero coefficient values to different coefficient values
before entropy coding operation. Specifically, this module modifies the magnitude of the
coefficient values.
2.3.2.3 Secret Transformation (ST)
ST (Siu et al., 2009) randomly selects a 4×4 integer transformation function from either
IntDCT or an other integer transformation, such as integer discrete sign transformation.
2.3.2.4 Quantization Parameter Manipulation (QPM)
QPM (Spinsante et al., 2005) modifies the quantization parameters of each MB to alter-
nate the reconstructed coefficient values.
2.3.2.5 Deblocking Filter Value Modification (DFV)
H.264/AVC encoder utilizes the deblocking filter to reduce block noise before the motion
estimation operation and the compensation operation. DFV (Siu et al., 2009) is designed
20
to alter the global deblocking filter value for achieving distortion effect.
2.3.2.6 MV Difference Modification (MVD)
MVD (Su et al., 2011) modifies the motion vectors and their differences.
2.3.2.7 Secret Scan Order (SSO)
To encode coefficient values in each MB, the 4×4 Zigzag scan is utilized in H.264/AVC.
SSO (Su et al., 2011) utilizes difference scan orders to achieve distortion effect.
2.3.2.8 INTER-Prediction Mode Modification (INTER-MM)
In H.264/AVC, various the subdivisions/Sub MB (subMB), namely number of 16× 16,
16× 8, 8× 16 and 8× 8 blocks, are utilized to facilitate compression gain. INTER-
MM (Yuan et al., 2005) proposed a shuffling the prediction mode of the compatible struc-
ture MBs in INTER-frame, because simply shuffling difference structure MB causes de-
coding problems.
2.3.2.9 INTRA-Prediction Mode Modification (INTRA-MM)
Similarly to INTER-MM, by modifying intra prediction mode of the input video, dis-
torted videos can be obtained. INTRA-MM (Yuan et al., 2005) proposed a prediction
mode modification prior to the transformation process (i.e., IntDCT). The aforementioned
modules are selectively included in the conventional encryption methods, which are sum-
marized in Table 2.3. Note that the interpretation of the Table is the same manner as in
Table. 2.2. The recently proposed format-compliant selective encryption methods (Yong-
sheng et al., 2013; B. Zeng et al., 2014) claim that their methods are secure against crypt-
analytic attacks.
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2.3.3 Cryptanalysis
Cryptographic attacks aim to reconstruct the original image/video from its encrypted im-
age/video. Note that known-plaintext attack and chosen-plaintext attack are well known
as cryptographic attacks. Thus, most conventional format-compliant selective encryp-
tion methods were designed to avoid information leaking by the cryptographic attacks.
However, other attack approaches may success to obtain information of the original con-
tent. To my best knowledge, two perceptual attack approaches exist as follows: (A)
error-concealment based attack, and (B) replacement attack. Approach (A) utilizes error-
concealment techniques, which handle the encrypted parts as missing parts. Approach
(B) substitutes the encrypted parts with attacker-defined data. These perceptual attack
approaches can reconstruct only low-quality outputs of the original image/video from
image/video encrypted by shuffling DCT coefficients.
Although the aforementioned format-compliant selective encryption methods satisfy
conventional cryptanalysis and perceptual attack approaches, a perceptual attack (here-
inafter referred to as sketch attack), Nonzero Coefficient Count Attack (NZCA) (W. Li
& Yuan, 2007), is put forward to extract a set of rough contour lines of the original im-
age directly from its JPEG encrypted images. Therefore, the sketch image by the sketch
attack can show visual information extracted from encrypted images.
2.3.4 Conventional Sketch Attack
Although a novel attacking approach, namely sketch attack, is invented, the community
put attention only to cryptographic attacks (Takayama et al., 2006; Wong & Tanaka, 2010;
M. Zhang & Tong, 2014). In the surveyed literature for this thesis, there is only one sketch
attack (NZCA) (W. Li & Yuan, 2007) in the compressed domain. NZCA (W. Li & Yuan,
2007) utilizes the number of nonzero coefficients in each 8×8 block to generate a sketch
image φZ , which consists of the pseudo-luminance values calculated as follows:
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φZ(x,y) = φ
′
Z(bi/8c,b j/8c) (2.6)
φ
′
Z(i, j) =

0 n(i, j)< n1
255 n1 ≤ n(i, j)≤ n2
(2.7)
where φ ′Z(i, j) is the pseudo-luminance value in F(i, j), and n(i, j) is the number of non-
zero AC coefficients in the (i, j)-th 8× 8 block in F(i, j), where the number of AC co-
efficients implies the spatial activity of a block. The two values, viz. n1 and n2, are the
two threshold values to tune the sketch image, where proper threshold values will sep-
arate backgrounds and foregrounds. The sketch attack considers only AC coefficients
attained by DCT, hence other components in the compressed domain, which can be used
for feature extraction, still remained.
2.4 Overview of Outline Clearness Assessment
Although edge images (obtained from edge detector) and sketch images (obtained from
sketch attack) are generated in different domains, they both show the outline of the im-
age/video frame of interest. Therefore in this thesis, these images and their detectors are
referred by using the terms outline image and outline detector, respectively.
A general process flow for outline-based applications can be summarized in Fig-
ure 2.5, where input indicates image/video frame data and output indicates the results
of the applications. This flow is utilized in advanced automated applications, including
textual enhancement (Chi & Eramian, 2015), text detection (Akhaee et al., 2010; Shivaku-
mara et al., 2011), and image segmentation (Tong et al., 2005). However, outline-based
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Outline	  
detector	  
Outline-­‐based	  
applica2on	  Input	   Output	  
Figure 2.5: General process flow of outline-based application system
application systems may not be robust against the intrinsic noise generated by outline de-
tectors, since outline-based applications are not designed to process noisy outline images.
Therefore, a reliable OCA is crucial in ensuring proper operability of the outline-based
application system of interest. Specifically, the goal of OCA is to objectively evaluate the
clearness of an outline image.
An obvious way of measuring outline clearness is to consider a subjective evaluation
by humans. However, such subjective evaluations are not only slow, cumbersome, time-
consuming and expensive, but it is also incapable for deployment in real-time applications
that adaptively adjust the operational parameters for improving application performance.
Some learning-based outline detectors are trained to detect outline from the input image,
but only clear images are presented during the training stage. Therefore, when the input
image is noisy, these outline detectors may not perform in the intended manner. Further-
more, since the ideal outline cannot be obtained in practical situations, it is futile to have
a reference based OCA metric.
In the literature, there are two classes of domain outline detectors, i.e., edge detector
and sketch attack, In addition, there are also two types of assessments, i.e., IQA for natural
images and an edge similarity assessment (W. Li & Yuan, 2007) for binary sketch images.
2.4.1 Overview of Outline Detector
Traditionally, the edge map is deployed in image processing applications, while the sketched
image is utilized to attack compressed-then-encrypted image (see Section 2.3.4). In this
section, the conventional edge detectors are briefly summarized.
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(a) Class (A) - CAN (b) Class(B) - SFE
Figure 2.6: Outline generated by methods in Class (A) and (B)
Edge refers to the collection of points where pixel intensities change abruptly. In the
surveyed literature for this thesis, edge detectors can be grouped into two categories (Y. Li
et al., 2015), viz.: (A) differentiation based, and; (B) learning based. Class (A) consid-
ers the discontinuities of brightness in an image, while Class (B) uses machine learning
approach to discriminate edge points from smooth regions by considering multiple low-
level cues extracted from the training images. In contrast to metrics in Class (A), metrics
in Class (B) is viable to alleviate the internal edges on textures. It is observed that the
internal edges of Figure 2.6(a) are removed in Figure 2.6(b). In addition, the edge detec-
tions in Class (B) are designed to resemble the human visual system perception, thus the
output image has a more semantic meaning of the image (Y. Li et al., 2015).
Class (A) edge detectors are designed to capture gradient in the input image. Specif-
ically, Sobel Edge Detector (SOB) (Gonzalez & Woods, 2006) is designed to find lo-
cal maxima of the first-order gradient at different orientations. Laplacian of Gaussian
(LOG) (Gonzalez & Woods, 2006) is designed to find zero-crossing points of second-
order derivative, where Gaussian filter is applied for smoothing the input image because
derivative operations are sensitive to noise. CAN (Canny, 1986) is designed to find the
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solution to an optimization problem with three criteria, viz., single-pixel response, local-
ization, detection accuracy. In addition, CAN outperforms several detectors, including
a recent metric (Y. Li et al., 2015), and it is still widely deployed in various applica-
tions. On the other hand, Structure Forest Based Edge Detector (SFE) (Dollar & Zitnick,
2013) from Class (B) learns color, gradient, and pair-wise differences by using structured
random forests derived from random decision forests (Geurts et al., 2006). By using
the learning results, the edge pixels of the input patch are allocated to structure random
forests. The edge responses are finally obtained as an aggregation (in this case averaging)
of the random forests. SFE is relatively low in computational complexity while achieving
comparable accuracy to the currently proposed methods.
2.4.2 IQA
Following the literature of IQA, in terms of reference dependency, all assessment meth-
ods can be grouped into three classes (Lin & Jay Kuo, 2011), viz.: (A) full-reference
based; (B) reduced-reference based, and; (C) no-reference based. Class (A) utilizes the
features extracted to the reference (original) image to assess the processed images. Class
(B) utilizes the features of some part(s) in the reference image. On the other hand, no
information about the reference image is required by Class (C), thus the fact make Class
(C) is the most attractive assessment metric in the image processing research community.
Various no-reference IQA methods (Attar et al., 2015; Guan et al., 2015; L. Li et
al., 2015; F. Qian et al., 2015; Q. Wu et al., 2015) are proposed recently, and many of
them achieve promising results when handling natural images. However, the features
considered in these no-reference IQA methods may not be directly applicable to evaluate
outline image (further discussed in Section 4.3). These shortcomings of the conventional
no-reference IQA methods motivated us to form a no-reference assessment method for
outline image quality evaluation.
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2.4.3 Edge Similarity
In addition to the sketch attack (NZCA), Li et al. (W. Li & Yuan, 2007) proposed an edge
similarity evaluation method, which considers the SOB edge map Γ0 (Gonzalez & Woods,
2006) as the reference edge map. Note that, since the NZCA sketch image is binary form,
Otsu thresholding (Otsu, 1979) is applied to the SOB edge map to generate a binary
image, and then the output is resized because the sketch image is resolution smaller than
the binary SOB edge map. Let ζ0 denote the value obtained by the evaluation method.
The edge similarity equation can be expressed as follows:
ζ0 =
η1
2∆0
+
η2
2Θ0
− η3
2∆0
− η4
2Θ0
, (2.8)
where ∆0 denotes the total number of 0’s in SOB edge map Γ0 and Θ0 denotes the total
number of 1’s. In addition, the definitions of η1, η2, η3 and η4 are as follows, respec-
tively:
η1 = |{(x,y) : Γ0(x,y) = 0 & φ(x,y) = 0}|, (2.9)
η2 = |{(x,y) : Γ0(x,y) = 1 & φ(x,y) = 1}|, (2.10)
η3 = |{(x,y) : Γ0(x,y) = 0 & φ(x,y) = 1}|, (2.11)
η4 = |{(x,y) : Γ0(x,y) = 1 & φ(x,y) = 0}|. (2.12)
where φ denotes a sketch image. The particular behaviors of Li et al.’s (W. Li & Yuan,
2007) edge similarity evaluation method can be described as follows: (a) ζ0 = 1 indicates
that the sketch image and the reference edge map, in Li et al (W. Li & Yuan, 2007) case,
the scaled SOB edge map, are exactly the same; (b) ζ0 = −1 indicates that the sketch
image is exactly the negated map of the reference edge map, and; (c) ζ0 = 0 indicates that
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either the sketch image is random or the sketch image is completely black (0’s) or white
(i.e., 1’s).
2.5 Overview of Text Detection in Video
Text contained in video provides related information which enriches the video contents,
hence the text information can be utilized to video applications, i.e., video indexing and
retrieval (J. Zhang & Kasturi, 2008; Jung et al., 2004). In addition, the text information
in video can be utilized as features for labeling the events of the video contents, and
then the performance of the text information based methods are better when comparing
them with content based video retrieval methods based on semantics (J. Zhang & Kasturi,
2008; Jung et al., 2004). Therefore, text detection is arguably the most crucial step for the
aforementioned applications, (i.e., video indexing and retrieval).
Text in video can be classified into two categories, namely (A) graphics text , and;
(B) scene text. Graphics text is intentionally inserted text, i.e., subtitle and/or during
video production. In contrast, scene text is unintentionally captured text as a part of a
natural scene. Generally, graphics text due to text insertion is perceptually clear, in other
words, the video is high contrast. On the other hand, since scene text is captured from a
natural scene, scene text appears in various forms, such as font size variations, font type,
background, contrast, orientation, etc. Hence, text detection in scene text is a challenging
task. In particularly, multi-oriented text detection is technically challenging because es-
timating the orientation of the text is difficult and is not readily available. Therefore, the
research community is still pursuing multi-oriented text detection.
In the literature, text detection domain can be classified into the non-compressed
domain and the compressed domain. The following sub-sections review the conventional
methods in both domains.
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2.5.1 Overview of Text Detection in the Spatial Domain
In this sub-section, the representative conventional text detection (including localization)
methods in the spatial domain are overviewed. Text detection in the spatial domain can
be classified into three categories: (a) component based methods (Jain & Yu, 1998);
(b) texture based methods (Shivakumara et al., 2010, 2011), and; (c) edge and gradient
based methods (C. Liu et al., 2005; Shivakumara et al., 2012, 2013). First, component-
based methods perform well for caption and graphics text when these texts have uniform
color and high contrast. Next, texture based methods achieved sufficient detection per-
formances for complex background, however, these performances highly depend on the
font size and font type of the text as well as the computational cost is high. Last, edge
and gradient based methods achieved less computational cost against to texture based
methods. However, these methods are sensitive to cluttered background and thus produce
more false positives. In the aforementioned text detection methods, horizontal graphics
text has been focused while multi-oriented scene text has been put less attention.
Recently, few methods (Shivakumara et al., 2012, 2013) considering both graphics
and scene multi-oriented text have been proposed. However, the major issue of these
methods is that their accuracies are inconsistent across different image datasets. In ad-
dition, the text detection methods are designed by considering only the pixel values in
spite of the fact that most videos including text are stored in the compressed forms, which
consist of compressed components (e.g., coefficients). Since these features (such as trans-
formed coefficients, motion vectors and MBs type) have information, the components in
the compressed domain are practical for text detection. Furthermore, by using compo-
nents partially decoded from the compressed domain (Zhong et al., 1999), reduction of
the computational cost and storage space can be expected.
30
2.5.2 Overview of Text Detection in the Compressed Domain
Comparing to the number of text detection methods in the spatial domain have been in-
vestigated, the number of text detection in the compressed domain is small. In this sub-
section, the representative text detection methods in the Moving Picture Experts Group
(MPEG) domain are reviewed as following the published order. Early stage automated
text detection methods had focused on detecting caption text (i.e., subtitle or short de-
scription text). First, the text detection proposed by Zhong et al. (Zhong et al., 1999)
utilizes the information of entities in the MPEG domain and the results of a connected
component analysis, however, they put less attention to oriented scene text. Next, Dim-
itrova et al. (Dimitrova et al., 2000) considered the edge information induced from the
DCT coefficients and proposed a superimposed text detection in video. This method also
put attention to graphics text but not scene text in a video. Then, to achieve text detection
and tracking in the compressed domain, the information of text appearance and disappear-
ance in video frames is considered by Qian et al. (X. Qian et al., 2007). It is observed that
this approach is viable to detect horizontal graphics text. Then, text detection and track-
ing are further improved by Jiang et al. (Jiang et al., 2008) to achieve a faster method.
Since their method considers the defined starting and ending frames, and utilizes an ini-
tial threshold value for text matching, the performance depends on the threshold value.
Last, the DCT-based features are investigated by Goto et al. (Goto, 2008) to design scene
text detection, however, their method is only viable to horizontal text with high contrast.
Although, some text detection methods in the MPEG compressed domain are pro-
posed, the current most deployed video coding standard is H.264/AVC. A text detection
in H.264/AVC compressed video is proposed by Qian et al. (X. Qian et al., 2012) in the
surveyed literature. Although this method is designed to detect text in INTRA-frame, it
depends on threshold values for text block verification and it also targets on graphics text
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of horizontal direction only.
2.6 Overview of Sketch Attack
The surveyed conventional format-compliant selective encryption methods may be vul-
nerable to sketch attack (W. Li & Yuan, 2007), because some of the components stored in
the compressed domain remained intact. This fact suggests that all known sketch attacks
must be investigated and then a countermeasure should also be put forward to prevent
perceptual information leakage.
In addition, edge images play a significant role in multimedia applications, viz.,
enhancement (Chi & Eramian, 2015), segmentation (Tong et al., 2005), text detection
(Shivakumara et al., 2011), digital watermarking (Akhaee et al., 2010) and image retrieval
(Q. Li et al., 2016). Similarly, sketch images by sketch attacks may also play a significant
role in the aforementioned multimedia applications. Therefore, an assessment criterion of
the outline image, i.e., edge image and sketch image, is crucial to multimedia applications.
Furthermore, multimedia applications, including text detection (X. Qian et al., 2007),
encryption, visible watermarking, data hiding and foreground-background separation (Dey
& Kundu, 2013) in the compressed domain have been actively pursued by researchers
recently. As a new feature extraction process in the compressed domain, it is worth ex-
ploring sketch attack in related applications. Specifically, the study of new sketch attacks,
the study of outline assessment and the demonstration of sketch image based application
will be pursued.
2.7 Summary
The widely-deployed compression standards, including JPEG and H.264/AVC, are briefly
described and their format-compliant selective encryption and cryptanalysis are surveyed.
A novel perceptual attack, namely sketch attack, is introduced and the weakness of con-
ventional format-compliant selective encryption is analyzed. The analysis indicates that,
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after encryption, conventional encryption methods untouched some components. In other
words, the outline information of the original image can be extracted. On the other hand,
there are many multimedia applications based on edge/sketched images and the demand
of signal processing in the compressed domain. These facts justify the need for this study.
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CHAPTER 3: SKETCH ATTACKS FOR FORMAT-COMPLIANT
SELECTIVELY ENCRYPTED VIDEO
3.1 Overview
In this chapter, five novel sketch attacks are proposed to attack H.264/AVC videos en-
crypted by conventional format-compliant selective encryption methods. First, the lim-
itations of coefficient-based sketch attacks for H.264/AVC video in encrypted form are
described. In particularly, the performance of sketching outline image of the coefficient-
based sketch attacks is significantly low when INTER-frame is considered, where INTER-
frame includes significantly reduced temporal information. Next, a sketch attack consid-
ering the number of bits spent on coding an MB is put forward to sketch outline image
from INTER-frame. Then, the Canny edge map is considered as an ideal (reference) out-
line image to evaluate the sketch image. Last, using some video datasets, experiments are
conducted to verify the performance of the five proposed sketch attacks. Results suggest
that the sketch image of the MB bit based sketch attack can reveal an outline of not only
INTRA-frame but also INTER-frame.
3.2 Introduction
As mentioned in Section 2.3.2, generally conventional format-compliant selective video
encryption methods meet the security requirements against cryptographic attacks, such as
known/chosen-plaintext attacks. In addition, these encryption methods can be improved
by shuffling DCT coefficients within a block to withstand two kinds of perceptual attacks:
(a) error-concealment based attack (Jiangtao et al., 2002), and; (b) replacement attack (C.-
P. Wu & Kuo, 2005; Podesser et al., 2002).
However, to generate an outline image of the original (i.e., plaintext) JPEG image
directly from its encrypted counterpart, a sketch attack (i.e., NZCA) is proposed by Li et
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at. (W. Li & Yuan, 2007). Therefore, in terms of sketch attack, format-compliant selective
video encryption may not be completely secure.
In the following sections, 5 sketch attacks, including: DC Error Category Attack
(DCEC); Improved Nonzero Coefficient Count Attack (INCC); Position of the Last Nonzero
Coefficient Attack (PLZ); Sum of Absolute AC Coefficients Attack (SAC), and; MB
Bitstream Size Attack (MBS), are put forward to generate outline images directly from
H.264/AVC compressed-only or compressed then format-compliant selectively encrypted
(hereinafter, compressed-encrypted) videos. Then, the sketch images are evaluated by us-
ing the modified Edge Similarity Score (ESS) and the performances are discussed.
3.3 Proposed Sketch Attacks
Based on the literature survey carried out in this study, the method proposed in (W. Li
& Yuan, 2007) is the only sketch attack in the literature. The sketch attack can reveal an
outline image of the original image, however, the sketch attack requires manual tuning of
two threshold values, which limits the sketch attack to a manual operation. In addition,
the DC coefficients and the bits allocated to each MB have not been put attention by re-
searchers. Therefore, first, the DCEC, is put forward to verify the robustness of DC-based
format-compliant selective encryption method against unauthorized viewing. Next, three
threshold-free AC-based sketch attacks, namely, INCC, PLZ and SAC, are put forward.
Finally, MBS, is put forward. In this chapter, H.264/AVC compressed video in level 5.1
and Baseline Profile (BP) is considered to facilitate the discussion and avoid loss of gen-
erality. Specifically, BP utilizes only one slice within a frame, 4×4 IntDCT and 7 block
sizes, viz., 4× 4, 4× 8, 8× 4, 8× 8, 8× 16, 16× 8 and 16× 16 for H.264/AVC video
compression. The novel five sketch attacks are detailed to generate the outline images of
H.264/AVC compressed video in the following sub-sections.
35
3.3.1 DC Error Category Attack (DCEC)
DC coefficient value is the mean value of a transform block, hence, the DC coefficient
array of a video frame is essentially the original video frame. However, the resolution of
the array is smaller (i.e., 1/4 in the case of H.264/AVC) than that of the original frame.
In H.264/AVC video compression, the DC coefficients are processed by the DC predic-
tion function similar to that of edge detection. Thus, some edge information is carried
by the prediction errors of DC coefficients. Depending on their magnitudes, the predic-
tion errors are grouped into categories for coding purposes. Therefore, by considering a
representative value for each category, a sketch image φD can be generated as follows:
φD(i, j) = 2d(i, j), (3.1)
d(i, j) =

2log2 |r(i, j)| if |r(i, j)|> 0,
0 otherwise,
(3.2)
where (i, j) is the coordinate of the (i, j)-th 4×4 block and d(i, j) is the category of the
residue DC value r(i, j) (i.e., prediction error).
3.3.2 Improved Nonzero Coefficient Count Attack (INCC)
NZCA utilizes each the number of nonzero coefficients in each block, but this attack
requires manual thresholding. To solve this problem, a sketch image φN by INCC is
proposed as follows:
φN(i, j) = round
(
255× n(i, j)
max{n(i, j)}
)
, (3.3)
where the number of nonzero AC coefficients in the (i, j)-th 4×4 block denotes as n(i, j).
36
The number n(i, j) infers the complexity of the (i, j)-th 4×4 block, in other words, a small
n(i, j) implies low spatial activity within the block, and vice versa.
3.3.3 Position of The Last Nonzero Coefficient Attack (PLZ)
PLZ generates a sketch image φP by the position of the last nonzero coefficient of each
block, where, the Zigzag order is considered. The equation is as follows:
φP(i, j) = round
(
255× p(i, j)
max{p(i, j)}
)
, (3.4)
where the position of the last nonzero AC coefficients in the (i, j)-th block is denoted
as p(i, j). The value behaves as follows: (a) a large value when the block has more
complex, i.e., two-dimension DCT basis vector, and (b) a low value when the block has
less complex.
3.3.4 Sum of Absolute AC Coefficient Attack (SAC)
SAC generates a sketch image φS by the sum of absolute AC coefficients. Specifically,
φS(i, j) = round
(
255× s(i, j)
max{s(i, j)}
)
. (3.5)
where the sum of absolute of AC coefficients in the (i, j)-th 4× 4 block is denoted as
s(i, j).
3.3.5 MB Bitstream Size Attack (MBS)
In H.264/AVC encoders, an entropy coding (either CAVLC or CABAC) is utilized to
encode the DCT coefficients of an MB. It is found that a larger number of bits is spent for
an MB with higher spatial activity, and vice versa. Therefore, the complexity of an MB
infers as the bitstream size, which varies according to H.264/AVC compressed videos.
An example is shown in Figure 3.1, which shows four MBs (labeled as A, B, C and D)
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Figure 3.1: Four MBs (regions) with different spatial activities in a video frame com-
pressed by using H.264/AVC
in a 128×128 pixels region of an H.264/AVC compressed video frame. The marked MB
are different spatial activities. In particularly, 80 bits are allocated to region A consists of
a weak diagonal edge. On the other hand, 208 bits are allocated to region B consisting
of borders of the floor tiles, i.e., edges. Meanwhile, 146 bits are allocated to region C
including two areas of different colors along with an edge separating them. Finally, only
24 bits are allocated to smooth region D with no edges. Based on these observations, an
MB-based sketch image, viz., MBS image φB, can be generated as follows:
φB(im, jm) = round
(
255× b(im, jm)
max{b(im, jm)}
)
, (3.6)
where im ∈ [0,X/16], jm ∈ [0,Y/16], hence the resolution is 1/16 of its original counter-
part. The number of bits spent on encoding the (im, jm)-th MB is denoted as b(im, jm).
Note that the ratio of b(im, jm) over max{b(im, jm)} is considered by MBS.
In this section, sketch images by the proposed sketch attacks are presented. Specif-
ically, the proposed sketch attacks are applied to an H.264/AVC compressed video. Fig-
ure 3.2 shows the original frame and the sketch images obtained by applying the pro-
posed sketch attacks (viz.: DCEC; INCC; PLZ; SAC, and; MBS of the first frame of
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(a) Original (b) DCEC #1 (c) INCC #1
(d) PLZ #1 (e) SAC #1 (f) MBS #1
Figure 3.2: Original frame and sketch images of the original I-frame (in Video 17 from
ICDAR2013) generated by using: DCEC; INCC; PLZ; SAC, and; MBS
Video 17 from International Conference Document Analysis and Recognition 2013 (IC-
DAR2013)). It is found that outline images for the 1st frame (i.e., I-frame) are generated
by the five proposed sketch attacks. On the other hand, the original frames and the sketch
images for the third frame (i.e., P-frame) are shown in Figure 3.3. Result suggests that,
when handling an INTER-frame such as P- or B-frame, Coefficient-based sketch attacks,
(viz.: DCEC; INCC; PLZ, and; SAC) fail to generate a perceptually meaningful sketch
image.
The reason is that only the information of the I-frame is encoded independently from
the rest of the frames (similar to the scenario of still-image), while the information of
the differences between the current and previous/future frames through motion estima-
tion is encoded for P- or B-frames. It is concluded that the coefficient-based sketch at-
tacks are less effective in sketching H.264/AVC compressed videos, when compared to
JPEG (B.Pennebaker & L.Mitchell, 1992) compressed images. On the other hand, regard-
less of the frame type, the sketch images by MBS are viable to show outline information
of the H.264/AVC compressed video.
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(a) Original (b) DCEC #3 (c) INCC #3
(d) PLZ #3 (e) SAC #3 (f) MBS #3
Figure 3.3: Original frame and sketch images of the original P-frame (in Video 17 from
ICDAR2013) generated by using: DCEC; INCC; PLZ; SAC, and; MBS
3.4 Sketch Image Evaluation
Recall that Li et al.’s (W. Li & Yuan, 2007) evaluation method (see Section 2.4.3) is
designed to map one output value for 8×8 pixel block in constructing the NZCA image.
Therefore the evaluation is not applicable directly to H.264/AVC compressed video. To
evaluate sketch images in terms of quantity, two steps: (a) binary edge image definition,
and; (b) edge similarity evaluation, are considered by extending the evaluation method of
NZCA to different block sizes.
3.4.1 Definition of Reference Binary Edge Image
In the literature, there are many edge detectors (see Section 2.4.1), including CAN (Canny,
1986), SOB (Gonzalez & Woods, 2006), and LOG (Gonzalez & Woods, 2006). To obtain
the reference edge map Γ, the CAN is adopted as the edge detector (instead of SOB used
by Li et al.), because hysteresis thresholding, which can detect continuous edge curve,
is employed by the CAN and even some weak parts of an edge can be detected by the
CAN. A sketch image φ depends on the information of a block transformation or an MB.
In other words, a sketch image φ is of size X/δ ×Y/δ for δ being the size of a block
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transformation or an MB. Thus, φ is smaller than the CAN edge image Γ which is of size
X × Y . Therefore, to match the dimension of the sketch image, resizing the Canny binary
edge map Γ is required. To generate the down-scaled CAN binary edge map ΓD, a few
operations (i.e., block partition, edge candidate calculation, and edge candidate classify-
ing) are conducted. First, non-overlapping blocks each of δ × δ pixels are obtained by
dividing the CAN binary edge map. Next, by using following the equation, the number
of edge candidates for each block ΓN is calculated. The equation is as follows:
ΓN(i, j) =
δ
∑
u=1
δ
∑
v=1
Γu,v(i, j). (3.7)
Here, Γu,v(i, j) denotes the (u,v)-th value in the (i, j)-th δ ×δ block, where 1≤ i≤ X/δ ,
1≤ j ≤ Y/δ and 1≤ u,v≤ δ .
The number of edge candidates for each block is classified to generate the down-
scaled CAN binary edge map ΓD as follows:
ΓD(i, j) =

1 if ΓN(i, j)> 0,
0 otherwise.
(3.8)
The original image, the CAN edge map and the down-scaled CAN edge maps are shown
in Figure 3.4.
3.4.2 Edge Similarity Score (ESS)
The obtained down-scaled CAN edge map ΓD is utilized in the edge similarity met-
ric (W. Li & Yuan, 2007) (see Section 2.4.3) instead of SOB edge map Γ0. In addition,
the negated down-scaled edge images of Figure 3.4(c) and (d) are shown in Figure 3.5(a)
and (b), respectively. It is observed that both outlines of the down-scaled images and their
negated images are almost similar. In addition, for edge similarity evaluation, only the
edges are of interest regardless of whether the sketch image is positively or negatively
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(a) Original (b) CAN
(c) Down-scaled (δ = 4) (d) Down-scaled (δ = 16)
Figure 3.4: Illustration of CAN edge map and down-scaled CAN edge maps
(a) Negated down-scaled (δ = 4) (b) Negated down-scaled (δ = 16)
Figure 3.5: Illustration of negated down-scaled CAN edge maps
correlated. Therefore, the absolute value of Equation (3.9) is considered in this study.
The defined ESS, ζ is denoted as follows:
ζ = |ζ0|=
∣∣∣∣∣η
′
1
2∆
+
η ′2
2Θ
− η
′
3
2∆
− η
′
4
2Θ
∣∣∣∣∣ . (3.9)
where ∆ and Θ denote the number of 0’s and 1’s in the down-scaled CAN edge map ΓD,
respectively. In addition, η ′1, η
′
2, η
′
3, and η
′
4 are defined as follows:
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0.3406 0.5303 0.4016 0.2594 0.3151
(a) Video 17 in ICDAR2013
0.4352 0.4037 0.5883 0.6357 0.6011
(b) Video 20 in ICDAR2013
Figure 3.6: Sketch images using MBS for frame #1 to #5 and the corresponding ESS
scores
η
′
1 = |{(i, j) : ΓD(i, j) = 0 & φ(i, j) = 0}|, (3.10)
η
′
2 = |{(i, j) : ΓD(i, j) = 1 & φ(i, j) = 1}|, (3.11)
η
′
3 = |{(i, j) : ΓD(i, j) = 0 & φ(i, j) = 1}|, (3.12)
η
′
4 = |{(i, j) : ΓD(i, j) = 1 & φ(i, j) = 0}|. (3.13)
Note that ζ ∈ [0,1], where any value nearer to unity indicates a better match between
the sketch image φ and the down-scaled CAN edge map ΓD, where CAN edge map is as-
sumed as the ideal outline. In other words, a larger value implies better sketch quality, and
vice versa. To demonstrate the sketch images and their obtained ESS, the MBS sketch
images and their corresponding ESS are shown in Figure 3.6. It is observed that MBS
is viable to sketch the outline of both steady (upper row, i.e., Video 17 in ICDAR2013
- browsing products in a super market) and non-steady (lower row, i.e., Video 20 in IC-
DAR2013 - captured from driver’s seat) videos. The most ESS values of the non-steady
video are higher than the corresponding ESS values of the steady video. The reasons
are that non-steady video has more scene changes and the MBs need to more bits to en-
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code. Therefore, MBS can effectively exploit this property to generate a better outline. In
addition, it is observed that blurred sketch images yield lower ESS scores, and vice versa.
3.5 Experiments and Discussions
In this section, six video sequences, viz.: two video sequences from the ICDAR2013
video dataset (Karatzas et al., 2013), two video sequences from Ultra High Definition
High Efficiency Video Coding (HEVC) dash dataset (Feuvre et al., 2014), and two video
sequences from Xiph.org video test media (HD content and above) (Xiph.org video test
media, n.d.), are considered to verify the viability of the proposed sketch attacks. Note
that the resolution of the ICDAR2013 videos is 1280× 960 pixels, while the resolution
of the HEVC dash and Xiph.org video test media videos range from 1920× 1080 to
3840× 2160 pixels. To conduct experiments, using the BP with level 5.1, the first 30
frames of each test video are encoded into H.264/AVC format and then partially decoded
for sketching the outline. To avoid loss of generality, the initial QP in H.264/AVC is
set at 30. To implement the proposed sketch attacks, the H.264/AVC reference soft-
ware (Tourapis Michael et al., 2009) is utilized for partial decoding purpose to obtain the
components of a H.264/AVC compressed videos, then the sketch images are generated
by implementing codes on Matlab. Note that, when an MB of type Pulse-Code Modu-
lation (PCM) is encountered, the value of the 2nd largest MB bitstream size within the
same frame will be output. Last, to obtain the final binary outline image, Otsu threshold-
ing (Otsu, 1979) is applied to the obtained sketch image.
3.5.1 Non-Encrypted Video
Generally, the two types of frames (i.e., INTRA- and INTER-frame) are utilized to form
an H.264/AVC compressed video, therefore, the two types of frame are considered sep-
arately. In this sub-section, to show the performance of the proposed sketch attacks, the
non-encrypted video (i.e., the best case scenario) is considered. This case scenario is
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Table 3.1: ESS of sketch images for H.264/AVC INTRA-frame with initial
QP = 20,30, and 40
Dataset Sequence QP DCEC INCC PLZ SAC MBS
ICDAR
2013
Video 17
(1280×960)
20 0.1884 0.4062 0.3595 0.2140 0.4595
30 0.2194 0.1531 0.2664 0.1684 0.3406
40 0.0436 0.0345 0.0345 0.0345 0.3162
Video 20
(1280×960)
20 0.1851 0.5795 0.6194 0.2707 0.5210
30 0.1665 0.3527 0.3686 0.2193 0.4352
40 0.1186 0.1233 0.1233 0.1233 0.4524
HEVC
dash
v5
(1920 × 1080)
20 0.0920 0.4653 0.4881 0.2092 0.7494
30 0.1340 0.2426 0.2946 0.1491 0.5001
40 0.0947 0.0394 0.0750 0.0409 0.4549
v9
(3840 × 2160)
20 0.0901 0.4912 0.5660 0.1559 0.8062
30 0.1032 0.2346 0.2664 0.1033 0.4209
40 0.0650 0.0608 0.0464 0.0608 0.3780
Xiph
Old town cross
(3840×2160)
20 0.2503 0.3228 0.2748 0.3798 0.3299
30 0.2910 0.3576 0.2910 0.1490 0.6857
40 0.0421 0.0204 0.0531 0.0204 0.3989
Rush hour
(1920×1080)
20 0.1413 0.1772 0.1090 0.1076 0.3853
30 0.1235 0.0606 0.0606 0.0606 0.4914
40 0.0162 0.0035 0.0169 0.0035 0.1876
crucial to show the performance of the proposed sketch attacks, because if the proposed
sketch attacks cannot even sketch the outline from the plaintext video, it will not be able
to sketch from the encrypted video. Since sketch attack exploits the features (i.e., the
complexity of each MB) in the compressed domain, if the complexity features are similar
in both a non-encrypted video and its encrypted video, the sketch images obtained from
the non-encrypted and encrypted videos are similar.
3.5.1.1 INTRA-Frame
When the sketch images by five sketch attacks on the INTRA-frames of six videos (i.e.,
two videos from every dataset, three datasets in total) are considered, the ESS values
recorded in Table 3.1 are obtained, where the best ESS result among five sketch attacks
is bolded for quick look-up purpose. It is observed that, when QP increases regardless
of the video in question, except for Old town cross and Rush hour, the ESS values for
all sketch attacks decrease. Besides, when QP ≤ 30, MBS yields the best results. In
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(a) Sketch image generated from
original video frame with resolution
1920×1080 pixels
(b) Sketch image generated from
original video frame with resolution
3840×2160 pixels
Figure 3.7: Sketch images by MBS for the same video (UHD HEVC Dash Dataset) with
two different resolutions
addition, when compared to all considered conventional methods for QP = 40 (i.e., the low
bitrate case), the sketch images of MBS are particularly high ESS values. Hence, MBS
appears to be robust against heavy compression (i.e., using large QP value). The reason is
that most DCT coefficients both AC and DC) are quantized to zeros to reduce redundant
information in the compressed videos, hence, in terms of extracting information from
the compressed videos, the coefficient-based sketch attacks (i.e., DCEC, INCC, PLZ and
SAC) are ineffective. Therefore, MBS is viable to generate sketch images at a quality
comparable to that of the other sketch attacks for smaller QPs when handling INTRA-
frame. In the rest case of QP ≥ 30, the ESS values of MBS further outperform.
In addition, it is observed that, when the resolution increases, the quality of the
sketch images improves. To verify the trend, the sketch images of the same video frame
at different resolutions are shown in Figure 3.7(a) and (b), where two difference resolu-
tions, i.e., 1920× 1080 and 3840× 2160 pixels are considered. It is an expected result
that generating a sketch image of high-resolution gives a high-quality sketch image, be-
cause encoding high-resolution frame requires more MBs, which include more semantic
information of the frame. Therefore, when scaled to the same size for display, sketch
images of higher resolution will show greater detail, and vice versa.
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Table 3.2: Average ESS of sketch images for H.264/AVC INTER-frame with initial
QP = 20,30, and 40
Dataset Sequenc QP DCEC INCC PLZ SAC MBS
ICDAR
2013
Video 17
(1280×960)
20 0.0420 0.1987 0.2044 0.0886 0.4220
30 0.0432 0.1779 0.1871 0.0808 0.4115
40 0.0376 0.1372 0.1442 0.0684 0.3841
Video 20
(1280×960)
20 0.0235 0.0330 0.0177 0.0444 0.5490
30 0.0219 0.0317 0.0162 0.0421 0.5469
40 0.0206 0.0302 0.0178 0.0396 0.5298
HEVC
dash
v5
(1920×1080)
20 0.0001 0.0005 0.0004 0.0002 0.2636
30 0.0003 0.0006 0.0006 0.0003 0.3061
40 0.0012 0.0018 0.0016 0.0009 0.3357
v9
(3840×2160)
20 0.0002 0.0006 0.0004 0.0004 0.5671
30 0.0003 0.0007 0.0006 0.0004 0.5668
40 0.0019 0.0027 0.0027 0.0025 0.5496
Xiph
Old town cross
(3840×2160)
20 0.0293 0.0288 0.0139 0.0306 0.4407
30 0.0205 0.0210 0.0136 0.0234 0.4059
40 0.0202 0.0267 0.0202 0.0261 0.3940
Rush hour
(1920×1080)
20 0.1156 0.0876 0.1223 0.0711 0.3337
30 0.1052 0.0834 0.1163 0.0623 0.3321
40 0.0975 0.0787 0.1051 0.0566 0.3366
3.5.1.2 INTER-Frame
Next, the average ESS values (see Table 3.2) for the case of INTER-frame are discussed.
It is observed that, regardless of the video and QP value under consideration, MBS al-
ways yields, by far, the highest ESS values. Results suggest that MBS is superior and
capable of extracting information from INTER-frames where much of the redundancy is
removed. Therefore, when compared to other proposed sketch attacks, MBS sketch attack
is consistent and more robust to frame-type and QP parameter.
3.5.2 Format-Compliant Selectively Encrypted Video
To proof the viability of sketch attacks, two recently published format-compliant selective
encryption methods (Yongsheng et al., 2013; B. Zeng et al., 2014) are considered in this
section. Since, in Section 3.5.1, the sketch images of DCEC gave the low performance,
only four sketch attacks, namely INCC, PLZ, SAC, and MBS, are henceforth considered.
As the representative test video sequences, 30 frames from the videos in the IC-
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Figure 3.8: ESS of INCC for various
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Figure 3.9: ESS of PLZ for various en-
cryption methods
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Figure 3.10: ESS of SAC for various
encryption methods
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Figure 3.11: ESS of MBS for various
encryption methods
DAR2013 dataset are utilized and then encrypted by using (Yongsheng et al., 2013)
and (B. Zeng et al., 2014). The graphs of ESS for INCC, PLZ, SAC and MBS are shown
in Figure 3.8, 3.9, 3.10, and 3.11, respectively.
Note that the Not encrypted curve refers to the obtained ESS score when comparing
the ground truth (i.e., Canny binary edge map ΓD) to the sketch images by the respective
sketch attacks on the plaintext (i.e., not-encrypted) frames. It is observed that the ESS
value for Wang et al.’s encryption method (Yongsheng et al., 2013) is almost identical
to that of the original plaintext video. This trend suggests that the complexity of each
MB, which could be exploited to generate sketch images of the original video, can not
be masked by the encryption (Yongsheng et al., 2013). On the other hand, Zeng et al.’s
method (B. Zeng et al., 2014) yields different trends for all considered sketch images.
The trend includes higher and lower ESS values comparing with the counterparts of orig-
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(a) Encrypted
(b) INCC
(c) PLZ
(d) SAC
(e) MBS
Figure 3.12: Video 17 in ICDAR2013 (first 5 frames) encrypted by using Refer-
ence (B. Zeng et al., 2014) and the corresponding sketch images (2nd to 5th rows)
inal plaintext videos. A possible reason for this trend is that Zeng et al.’s encryption
method (B. Zeng et al., 2014) changes the magnitude of coefficients, the utilized frequen-
cies of coefficients and the number of coefficients, hence each MB bitstream size also
changes. More noteworthy is that varied ESS values for all considered sketch attacks are
observed, but nonetheless the highest ESSs are obtained by the MBS.
Next, the encrypted images by Zeng et al.’s method (B. Zeng et al., 2014) and the
corresponding sketch images by all considered sketch attacks are demonstrated in Fig-
ure 3.12 and 3.13. Specifically, the first 5 frames of a representative steady video and
a representative non-steady video (i.e., Video 17 and Video 20 from ICDAR2013, re-
spectively) are considered. It is clearly observed that all considered sketch attacks are
viable to generate sketch images of the first (i.e., INTRA-) frame, however, the three
49
(a) Encrypted
(b) INCC
(c) PLZ
(d) SAC
(e) MBS
Figure 3.13: Video 20 in ICDAR2013 (first 5 frames) encrypted by using Refer-
ence (B. Zeng et al., 2014) and the corresponding sketch images (2nd to 5th rows)
coefficient-based sketch attacks (i.e., INCC, PLZ, and SAC) failed to generate sketch im-
ages from INTER-frames while the MBS attack succeeded to generate the sketch images
from INTER-frames. Besides, it is observed that the ESS curves for INTER-frames in
Figure 3.11 are almost stable.
In addition, to demonstrate the ESS curves of all considered sketch attacks for var-
ious QPs, Figure 3.14 and Figure 3.15 respectively show the ESS graph of INTRA- and
INTER-frames encrypted by Zeng et al.’s method (B. Zeng et al., 2014), where these
frames are of Video 17 from ICDAR2013 (Karatzas et al., 2013). In this case of INTRA-
frame, the ESS values of the considered sketch images vary. Specifically, the ESS differ-
ences between MBS and other considered sketch attacks are small when QP is between
25 and 35, MBS always gives higher ESS than those of other considered sketch attacks
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Figure 3.14: Graph of ESS vs. QP for
various sketch attacks in INTRA-frame
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Figure 3.15: Graph of ESS vs. QP for
various sketch attacks in INTER-frame
Table 3.3: Specific features exploited by each sketch attack
LevelDC LevelAC Coefno Coefpo MB bits
DCEC X × × × ×
INCC × × X × ×
PLZ × × × X ×
SAC × X × × ×
MBS × × × × X
for all QP’s considered. On the other hand, since significant information reduction dur-
ing video encoding for INTER-frames, ESS of INCC, PLZ, and SAC drastically dropped
while MBS still yields stable performance with high ESS values. A similar trend is ob-
served when considering other test videos. Therefore, it is concluded that, regardless of
frame-type and QP, MBS is a viable sketch attack method.
3.5.3 Analysis
In this subsection, the considered sketch attacks are analyzed in terms of the exploited
feature, viability to the encryption modules and the histogram of sketch image, respec-
tively. First, Table 3.3 lists the exploited features by each sketch attack. Specifically, the
items of the top row denote following features, respectively: (a) LevelDC is residual DC
values, which is the outputs of prediction process in H.264/AVC; (b) LevelAC is the quan-
tized AC coefficient values; (c) Coefno is the number of nonzero AC coefficients of each
block; (d) Coefpo is the position of the last nonzero AC coefficient index with respect to
the Zigzag order in each block, and; (e) MB bits is the number of bits allocated to each
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Table 3.4: Viability of sketch attacks for various H.264/AVC format-compliant selective
encryption modules for video
S L ST QPM DF MVD SSO INTER-MM INTRA-MM
DCEC X × × X X X X × X
INCC X X × X X X X × X
PLZ X X × X X X × × X
SAC X × × X X X X × X
MBS X × X X X X X X X
MB. Since the first four sketch attacks in the first column, i.e., DCEC, INCC, PLZ and
SAC, utilize the IntDCT coefficients, hence it is observed that the sketch attacks fail to
generate outline images when the IntDCT coefficient values are changed, while MBS is
able to generate an outline image of the frame.
Next, the viability of each sketch attack in generating the outline directly from the
encrypted H.264/AVC video is discussed. From format-compliant selective encryption
modules in Section 2.3.2, the exploited feature in Table 3.3 and the aforementioned ex-
periment observations, the viability of each sketch attack can be derived as shown in
Table 3.4. Note that the interpretation of the Table is the same manner as in Table. 2.2.
Specifically, the box of row α and column β is marked with X (×), it means the sketch
attack method α can (cannot) generate the outline image of the video when module β is
applied to the video encryption method. Table 3.4 suggests that MBS is viable to generate
an outline image directly from the encrypted video, except when IntDCT coefficient level
modification is involved. Here, INCC and PLZ are robust to IntDCT coefficient level
modification. This fact also suggests that appropriate sketch attack(s) can be selected
by using some information about the encryption in use to obtain better sketch image(s)
instead using one attack. For example, statistical analysis can be performed on the dis-
tribution of coefficient values, motion vectors, scanning orders, etc., for determining en-
cryption modules, and then the appropriate attack is launched. This appropriate attack is
beyond the scope of this research and the issue will be pursued in this direction as future
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Figure 3.16: Histogram of each sketch images prior to applying Otsu’s binarization for
frame #2 to #5 shown in Figure 3.12
work.
Last, the histograms of the captured values are considered to clearly differentiate
the information/statistics captured by each sketch attack. The obtained histograms of
the sketch images by the considered sketch attacks are shown in Figure 3.16, where the
plaintext video - Video 17 from ICDAR2013 for frame #2 to frame #5 is considered as a
test video. Here, the frame #1 (i.e., INTRA-frame) is not considered, because the sketch
images by INCC, PLZ, SAC, and MBS give similar ESS values for INTRA-frame.
The theoretical range of bin values for INCC and PLZ is [0,15], but the observed
ranges are smaller than the theoretical range, e.g., [0,7] in the case of INCC for frame #5
(see right-top in Figure 3.16), while the range for SAC bins is significantly wider. Gen-
erally, the range of bins has effect displaying an image/frame, hence, it is expected that
the range for SAC displays a more contrasted image than those of INCC and PLZ. How-
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ever, since the hight compression efficiency of H.264/AVC, the bins of SAC are mostly
concentrated at the 0-th bin. Thus, low contrast images are obtained (see Figure 3.12).
On the other hand, only the distribution of MBS histogram is widely spread among
all the histograms considered. The fact suggests that MBS can generate outlines of higher
entropy (i.e., greater detail) when compared to the other sketch attacks. Therefore, a high
contrast sketch image can be obtained by MBS.
In addition, Otsu’s binarization method is applied to the sketch images (i.e., the
INCC, PLZ, SAC and MBS) for obtaining binary images. Note that Otsu’s binariza-
tion method utilizes bi-modal histogram properties to find the optimum threshold value.
Hence, since the histograms of INCC, PLZ, and SAC are mostly concentrated at the 0-th
bin, most pixel values will be treated as background, in other words, the intensity of pixels
is zero.
3.5.4 Is MBS Viable?
As the aforementioned discussions in Section 3.5.3, it is empirically found that MBS is
an effective attack in generating outline image from both INTRA- and INTER-frames en-
crypted by the conventional H.264/AVC format-compliant selective encryption modules.
However, since MBS is designed to exploit each MB information (i.e., the bits spent to
encode each non-overlapping 16×16 pixel block), straightforwardly, a shuffling MB op-
eration with maintaining format-compliant can be implemented to withstand the proposed
MBS sketch attack. It is because that MBS generates a pixel value from the correspond-
ing MB. Thus when the MBs of a video frame is shuffled, the generated pixel values
will also be shuffled. In other words, the shuffling operation prevents leaking the infor-
mation of the plaintext video. Although the shuffling operation before or during video
compression breaks the correlation among MBs, the operation induces the bitstream size
overhead. Hence researchers refrained from deploying the shuffling operation for video
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encryption. In addition, the shuffling operation requires additional operations, which
are fully/partially decoding the compressed-encrypted video, to complete the decryption
process. This requirement makes this encryption approach less feasible. On the other
hand, a shuffling MBs operation during or after video compression can be considered.
In H.264/AVC video compression, an error resilient tool of the Flexible MB Ordering
(FMO), which allows a video frame to be arranged in different scan patterns of MBs,
is included. Note that the FMO includes 6 built-in scan patterns as well as one option
to include an entire explicitly user-defined pattern viz., assigned through the parameter
MB Allocation MAP (MBAmap). Hence, the FMO information can be utilized to shuffle
MBs. Specifically, by masking the scan pattern of MBAmap, the FMO-based shuffling
can be deployed. However, FMO is only supported in the baseline and extended profiles
of H.264/AVC (Wiegand et al., 2003), this approach is also less practical.
Another alternative encryption approach against MBS is diffusing the perceptual in-
formation of a region into other regions. For example, an encryption operation diffuses
pixel values of an MB into other pixel values of MBs. Two diffusion scenarios using
this approach can be considered, namely diffusion before or during video compression,
and diffusion during or after video compression. In the first case, the diffusion approach
destroys the spatial correlation among the pixels of the original frame, hence the com-
pression efficiency will be dropped and the bitstream size overhead increases. In the
second case, the diffusion can theoretically maintain format-compliant, however, since
the nature of context adaptive entropy coding (i.e., CAVLC and CABAC) is complex,
the diffusion is not able to be implemented straightforwardly. It is because the adaptive
entropy coding uses multiple tables or statistical features of the input frame(s), hence
the original statistical information is required to maintain bitstream size. In addition, the
decode-encrypt-encode approach is always able to encrypt a compressed video, but the
cost in terms of time and space complexities are too high, especially for smart devices
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with limited battery power. It should be noted that the approach significantly causes the
bitstream size overhead.
It can be concluded that, since the format compliance and bitstream overhead sup-
pression are required for H.264/AVC video encryption, there are no straightforward en-
cryption methods, which can avoid local complexity information leakage (i.e., the com-
plexity of each MB) as well as the aforementioned requirements. Therefore, the proposed
MBS sketch attack is viable to extract outline information of the original frame directly
from the encrypted video in H.264/AVC format, which supports FMO in only a few pro-
files, i.e., baseline and extension. However, if security is the uppermost important issue
for a particular video, then the user can consider the shuffling operation in FMO or the
decode-encrypt-encode approach to withstand the proposed MBS at the expense of bit-
stream size overhead or high-cost computation and space. All in all, there is a trade-off
relationship among security, format compliance, and bitstream size overhead.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, five novel sketch attacks for format-compliant selectively encrypted video,
namely encrypted H.264/AVC video, were put forward to generate sketch images, which
can reveal an outline of each frame of the original video. Specifically, sketch images
are generated using the DC, AC coefficients or the MB bitstream size of the encrypted
video. In addition, to evaluate the performance of the sketch images by the proposed
sketch attacks, an edge similarity method was modified and then the similarity scores
were calculated by using the Canny edge map as an ideal outline image. It is observed
from experimental results that the proposed MBS sketch attack can extract and reveal
perceptual information directly from the video encrypted by format-compliant selective
encryption. It should be emphasized that, although the five proposed sketch attacks can
generate sketch images with a visible outline from the encrypted INTRA-frame, only the
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MBS can extract outline from the encrypted INTER-frame, which outnumbers INTRA-
frame, by far, in compressed video. Furthermore, it is validated that the MBS is more
robust against various compression parameter (i.e., QP) than the performance of the rest
proposed sketch attacks. Moreover, some future research directions are straightforward,
such as launching appropriate sketch attack(s) by determining the encryption module in
use, extending the sketch attacks to different video standards, i.e., HEVC, Audio Video
Standard (AVS) and Google VP9.
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CHAPTER 4: OUTLINE CLEARNESS ASSESSMENT
4.1 Overview
In this chapter, a no-reference outline clearness assessment metric is proposed as an out-
line quality assessment method. First, the incapability of the conventional no-reference
image quality metrics in assessing outline images is shown. To address this problem,
a novel no-reference outline clearness assessment metric is proposed that considers two
properties, viz., image entropy and spatial correlation. To validate the feasibility of the
proposed no-reference outline clearness assessment metric, experiments are conducted
by using two image datasets, viz., the University of Southern California - Signal and Im-
age Processing Institute (USC-SIPI) standard test images and the Berkeley Segmentation
Dataset and Benchmark (BSDS500) images. Results suggest that the proposed outline
clearness metric can give appropriate scores to outline images, and the scores are found
to vary according to the observed clearness and distortion introduced. In addition, the pro-
posed outline clearness metric is robust to compression and sensitive to Gaussian white
noise.
4.2 Introduction
As overviewed in Section 2.4, the ideal outline cannot be obtained in practical situations
and it is also futile to have a reference based outline clearness assessment metric. In
addition, general assessment approach of IQA evaluates how similar the target image is
with respect to the reference (original) image. On the contrary, the assessment approach
of this study tries to evaluate the outline information extracted from the non-compressed
or compressed data.
However, the features considered in conventional no-reference IQA metrics are fea-
tures of a natural image, and the conventional edge similarity assessment (W. Li & Yuan,
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2007) bases on binary images. Hence, the conventional assessment metrics may not be
directly applicable to evaluate outline images. These shortcomings of the conventional
assessment metrics motivated this study to design a no-reference clearness assessment
metric for outline images.
Since not all detected outline images are useful to describe the outline informa-
tion, the proposed assessment metric OCA makes an assumption, i.e., the ideal outline
image has only plain regions and perceptible gradients, which consists of contrasted
lines/textures. In other words, outline information depends on two factors: (a) image
entropy (Gonzalez & Woods, 2006), which is a global feature indicating the amount of
visual information based on the distribution of gray levels, and; (b) spatial correlation co-
efficient (Gonzalez & Woods, 2006), which is a local feature that captures the aggregated
relation between each pixel and its neighboring pixels. The proposed assessment metric
is designed to consider these two factors.
4.3 Limitations of Conventional No-reference IQA
Based on the literature survey carried out in this study, there are two types of outline
detector, i.e., edge detector and sketch attack (see Section 2.4.1). In this Chapter, rep-
resentative differentiation edge detectors, i.e., CAN (Canny, 1986), SOB (Gonzalez &
Woods, 2006) and LOG (Gonzalez & Woods, 2006), and a representative learning based
edge detector, SFE (Dollar & Zitnick, 2013) are considered. In addition, representative
sketch attacks (i.e., DCEC, INCC, SAC, and MBS) are also considered. The original
image and the corresponding outline images are shown in Figure 4.1.
Since the edge similarity assessment (W. Li & Yuan, 2007) bases on the SOB edge
map of the original and IQA is designed for natural images, practical no-reference OCA
metric is nonexistence. To evaluate the quality of outline images, a natural way is to
apply a no-reference IQA metric, such as (Kamble & Bhurchandi, 2015; Lin & Jay
59
(a) Original (b) CAN (c) SOB
(d) LOG (e) SFE (f) DCEC
(g) INCC (h) SAC (i) MBS
Figure 4.1: Original image, and outline images generated by edge detectors (CAN, SOB,
LOG, and SFE) and sketch attacks (DCEC, INCC, SAC, and MBS)
Kuo, 2011), directly. To investigate into the non-viability of this approach, the latest
IQA metrics, viz., Spatial-Spectral Entropy-Based Quality (SSEQ) (L. Liu et al., 2014),
Autoregressive-Based Image Sharpness Metric (ARISM) (Gu, Zhai, Lin, et al., 2015),
Non-Reference Free Energy-Based Robust Metric (NFERM) (Gu, Zhai, Yang, & Zhang,
2015), and Multi-domain Structural and Global Frequency Features + Piecewise Regres-
sion (MSGF-PR) (Q. Wu et al., 2015), which predict the Difference Mean Opinion Score
(DMOS) between the reference and the processed image, are considered.
Note that the scores range from [0,100], where DMOS = 0 implies the best quality
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Table 4.1: Predicted DMOS using recent no-reference IQA metrics
Metric CAN SOB LOG SFE DCEC INCC SAC MBS
SSEQ 36.39 52.40 37.68 47.36 11.33 -2.13 8.78 37.29
ARISM 151.20 154.74 152.04 47.28 NaN NaN NaN NaN
NFERM 162.04 133.16 167.79 55.17 6.63 36.35 9.21 77.48
MSGF-PR -917.99 44.90 675.09 46.29 15.03 16.28 5.81 63.52
NaN indicates non-a-number
and DMOS = 100 implies the worst quality. The implementations of these IQA metrics
are downloaded from the publicly accessible online repositories or obtained directly from
the authors.
Table 4.1 records the predicted DMOS for the reference images after training with
the Laboratory for Image and Video Engineering (LIVE) dataset (H.R. Sheikh & Bovik,
n.d.). As a representative example, the outline image for House is shown in Figure 4.1,
where the output of CAN, SOB and LOG (i.e., binary image) is mapped to grayscale
image by using 0→ 0 and 1→ 255. It is observed that the scores in Table 4.1 deviate
from my expectation. Specifically, by considering Figure 4.1, it is expected for CAN,
SOB, LOG and SFE to yield better DMOS than DCEC, INCC, SAC, and MBS. However,
DCEC or SAC appear to be the best approach to generate outline images among the
approaches considered. Furthermore, SSEQ (L. Liu et al., 2014) and MSGF-PR (Q. Wu
et al., 2015) yield negative values, which is out of their feasible ranges, and the result of
ARISM (Gu, Zhai, Lin, et al., 2015) is undefined because the size of the sketch image is
smaller than its minimum operational size. These observations imply that SSEQ, ARISM
and MSGF-PR are incapable in evaluating the clearness of outline images. Moreover,
NFERM (Gu, Zhai, Yang, & Zhang, 2015) yields larger DMOS values (i.e., worse result)
for outline (edge) images generated by CAN, SOB, LOG, and SFE when compared to the
outline (sketch) images generated by DCEC, INCC and SAC, which are counterintuitive.
In addition, MSGF-PR (Q. Wu et al., 2015) may fail to assess noisy images with Additive
Gaussian White Noise (AGWN) or salt and pepper noise. Figure 4.2 shows three outline
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(a) σA = 0: 36.38 (b) σA = 0.5: 49.79 (c) σA = 1.0: 38.44
Figure 4.2: Canny outline images with various AGWN and the corresponding image
clearness scores of MSGF-PR
images, each distorted with different AGWN. The standard deviation value σA in AGWN
and the corresponding predicted DMOS using MSGF-PR are also recorded. It is observed
that the MSGF-PR score is higher for the case of σA = 1.0 (see Figure 4.2(b)) when
compare to the case of σA = 0.5 (see Figure 4.2(c)). This observation does not match the
intuitive clearness assessment for the outline images shown in Figure 4.2.
Therefore, these results suggest that the conventional IQA metrics cannot be utilized
directly as OCA because they do not consider the spatial correlations. These findings
motivated this study to put forward a novel OCA metric.
4.4 Proposed OCA Metric
Literature survey suggests that is no OCA metric that could operate without referencing
(i.e., no-reference) to the original reference image, and the conventional no-reference IQA
metrics are found to be incapable in evaluating outline images (see Section 4.3). In that
regards, measurable features of sketch image are considered. In this work, it is assumed
that sketch image is not a color image, and it has outline and of high correlation in local
regions. To capture these features, two measures are introduced for OCA, viz., Grayscale
Image Information Entropy (GIIE), denoted by Λ f , to capture the global characteristics,
as well as Subsample Based SSIM (S3IM), denoted by Ξm, to capture the local character-
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Figure 4.3: Process flow of the proposed OCA metric
istics. The product of these measures then forms the proposed OCA metric ξ . Figure 4.3
shows the processes involved in the proposed OCA metric.
4.4.1 Outline Criteria
There are two recent works (Hou et al., 2013; Lopez-Molina, De Baets, & Bustince,
2013) for edge evaluation based on full-reference edge images. The common conclusion
drawn is that the ground truth labeled by human might be ambiguous and unreliable due
to the influence of personal decision. In addition, although there are various sophisticated
outline detectors (Liang & Yuen, 2013; Lopez-Molina, Baets, et al., 2013; McIlhagga,
2011; Yi et al., 2009), no-reference OCA does not exist, to date.
Since the ideal outline of an image may differ across applications, in this chapter,
the global and local features of outline images are considered. Ideally, outline images
should consist of some form of perceptual information, where its entropy must be greater
than a certain value. Furthermore, the recently published IQA metrics (Guan et al., 2015;
L. Li et al., 2015; F. Qian et al., 2015; Q. Wu et al., 2015) consider four types of dis-
tortion, viz.: (a) JPEG2000 compression; (b) JPEG compression; (c) AGWN, and; (d)
Gaussian blur, for evaluation purpose. Among them, the distortion caused by (c) and (d)
are more significant, because AGWN breaks the spatial correlation among neighboring
pixels while Gaussian blur smoothens the image, viz., the overall contrast of the image
decreases. Moreover, edge detectors (Lopez-Molina, Baets, et al., 2013) based on the
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multi-scale approach achieve promising performance, because the multi-scale approach
behaves similarly to the way humans interpret a scene. Based on these facts, it is assumed
that significant outline information is retained at any scales. Therefore, the aforemen-
tioned two criteria, namely, image entropy for global feature analysis and subsample
images correlation for local feature analysis are considered in the formulation of OCA
metric.
4.4.2 Grayscale Image Information Entropy (GIIE)
Shannon (Shannon, 1948) quantifies information as entropy Λ by considering uncertainty
in a random variable Z as follows:
Λ=− ∑
z ∈ Z
ρ(z) logρ(z), (4.1)
where z ∈ Z is a random variable value, and ρ(z) denotes the probability of z. In the case
of 8-bit grayscale image (i.e., gray level in the range [0,255]), the information entropy
(GIIE) Λg is defined as follows:
Λg =−
255
∑
l=0
ρ(l) log2ρ(l), (4.2)
where l denotes the gray level and ρ(l) denotes the probability of gray level l. The GIIE
value can be considered as a dynamic range indicator for an outline image, where a higher
value indicates a larger dynamic range, and vice versa. The GIIE value of an image close
to the maximum value (e.g., 8 when considering 8-bit grayscale image) means nearly all
gray levels are uniformly utilized to represent the image. By observation, a low entropy
value will suffice for a visible outline.
Table 4.2 records the entropy for eight groups of outline images, where each group
consists of nine standard test images (USC-SIPI, 2014), including Elaine, F-16, Fishing
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Table 4.2: Entropy Λg for various outline images
Image
Pixel DC AC Bitstream
CAN SOB LOG SFE DCEC INCC SAC MBS
Elaine 0.4351 0.1370 0.2478 3.7567 6.0554 4.1528 6.0846 6.8335
F-16 0.4070 0.2232 0.3196 3.8548 5.8432 4.6811 6.2806 7.1850
F.B. 0.5272 0.2427 0.4094 4.6556 5.9071 4.7391 6.7893 7.1994
House 0.5135 0.2408 0.4120 4.3956 6.0693 4.8163 6.7224 7.0287
Lenna 0.4242 0.2018 0.3026 4.1827 5.9679 4.4565 6.3459 7.0763
Mandrill 0.6875 0.2788 0.5299 4.0946 5.6853 5.0394 7.2762 7.3295
Peppers 0.3690 0.1721 0.2550 4.3476 6.1674 4.4022 6.1521 6.8074
S.L. 0.4479 0.2442 0.3674 4.6423 6.1051 4.8096 7.0608 7.0019
Splash 0.3613 0.1208 0.2143 3.3134 6.2088 4.0186 5.6770 7.1759
Average 0.4636 0.2068 0.3398 4.1381 6.0011 4.5684 6.4877 7.0708
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Figure 4.4: Histogram of the original and outline images shown in Figure 4.1
Boat (F.B.), House, Lenna, Mandrill, Peppers, Sailboat on Lake (S.L.), and Splash. The
first row indicates the metric used in generating the outline. The average entropy for CAN,
SOB, and LOG yield lower values when compared to others, because the distribution of
gray levels in these outline images are skewed (i.e., mostly zero to signify the non-edge
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regions or background) and the edge responses are thresholded into two values. On the
other hand, the rest of the edge detectors and the sketch attacks yield higher entropy.
Figure 4.4 shows the histogram corresponding to each image shown in Figure 4.1. By
observation, the histograms (of pixel values) of CAN, SOB, LOG and SFE outline images
are skewed, but the outlines are still visible. Hence, it can conclude that a low entropy
value will suffice for a visible outline.
To classify an outline image into either a visible or a non-visible outline image, a
non-linear function Λ f is introduced as follows:
Λ f =

1 if Λg ≥ Λt ;
0 otherwise,
(4.3)
where Λt denotes a threshold value. In this Chapter, Λt is empirically set at 0.05, which
yields the most suitable score matching to subjective assessment. Equation 4.3 classifies
an outline image as a meaningful or meaningless outline image.
4.4.3 Subsample based SSIM (S3IM)
Recall that an assumption is made earlier where significant outline information is retained
at any scales (see Section 4.4.1). In other words, the original and scaled outline images
have similar outline structures. To quantify similarity in terms of structure, the Structural
Similarity Index Measurement (SSIM) (Z. Wang et al., 2004) is modified in this Chap-
ter. Since SSIM is a full-reference assessment, it cannot be applied directly to evaluate
outline image without a reference image. Therefore, a modified SSIM, which transforms
SSIM (i.e., full-reference metric) into a no-reference assessment metric by removing the
reference image requirement, is proposed.
In the literature, multi-scale analysis (which analyzes images derived from the input
image) is utilized in IQA metrics (J. Qian et al., 2014; Z. Wang et al., 2003) because
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Figure 4.5: The concept of subsample based SSIM
multi-scale analysis resembles the mechanism of human visual system. Here, subsampled
images are utilized for multi-scale analysis to retain the ability of SSIM (Z. Wang et al.,
2004) in assessing structural information while removing the requirement of a reference
image. Figure 4.5 shows the architecture overview of the proposed subsample-SSIM
(S3IM) concept. First, an outline image of size M × N pixels is subsampled into 2× 2
blocks. Within each 2×2 block, the pixels are labeled as Top-Left (TL), Top-Right (TR),
Bottom-Left (BL) and, Bottom-Right (BR). Then, four subsampled images, each of size
M/2 × N/2 pixels, are formed by grouping the TL, TR, BL, and BR pixels. Next, each
subsampled outline image is upsampled by using bicubic interpolation metric to attain the
same size as the original outline image (i.e.,M× N). The upsampled images are denoted
uTL, uTR, uBL and uBR, respectively. Then, four SSIM values (Z. Wang et al., 2004)
are calculated for the following pairs: Original⊕uTL, Original⊕uTR, Original⊕uBL, and
Original⊕uBR.
The SSIM values are correspondingly denoted by Ξtl , Ξtr, Ξbl and Ξbr. Next, the
average of these SSIM values is then calculated and output as the S3IM value Ξm. S3IM
may be improved by subsampling at higher scales. However, the image considered (par-
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Table 4.3: S3IM scores for grayscale images and their corresponding outline images
Image
Pixel DC AC Bitstream
CAN SOB LOG SFE DCEC INCC SAC MBS
Elaine 0.7358 0.8168 0.6887 0.9759 0.6412 0.4638 0.5203 0.2972
F-16 0.7854 0.8148 0.7469 0.9737 0.6460 0.5435 0.6063 0.3461
F.B. 0.6783 0.7577 0.6329 0.9669 0.5827 0.5162 0.5223 0.3228
House 0.6945 0.7593 0.6677 0.9705 0.6417 0.5600 0.5872 0.3675
Lenna 0.7472 0.8117 0.7199 0.9688 0.6215 0.5367 0.5537 0.3638
Mandrill 0.6447 0.6928 0.5679 0.9788 0.5688 0.5400 0.5371 0.3642
Peppers 0.7576 0.8239 0.7414 0.9689 0.6467 0.5226 0.5542 0.3243
S.L. 0.7366 0.7411 0.6721 0.9691 0.5651 0.5352 0.5388 0.3419
Splash 0.7316 0.8873 0.7101 0.9770 0.7433 0.4478 0.5873 0.2550
ticularly sketch image) is relatively small, and hence much information will be removed
when the image is further sub-sampled. This problem will be considered as future work.
Table 4.3 shows the S3IM values for the grayscale and the outline images. The
S3IM values of SFE are higher when compared to other outline detectors. In addition, the
S3IM values of SAC are the highest among AC coefficients based outline detectors. The
results agree with the observation. With this construction, S3IM can measure the spatial
correlation without the need of any reference images.
4.4.4 OCA Score
The proposed OCA metric ξ is defined by the product of two measures, viz., GIIE Λ f
and S3IM Ξm. The proposed OCA metric can be expressed as follows:
ξ = Λ f ×Ξm, (4.4)
where ξ ∈ [0,1]. A value nearer to unity indicates a better outline clearness, and vice
versa. Hereinafter, the value calculated by the proposed OCA metric ξ is referred to as
the OCA score.
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Table 4.4: Average OCA scores for two image datasets
Dataset
Pixel DC AC Bitstream
CAN SOB LOG SFE DCEC INCC SAC MBS
Standard 0.7235 0.7895 0.6831 0.9722 0.6286 0.5184 0.5564 0.3314
BSDS500 0.5342 0.7111 0.5151 0.9526 0.6325 0.5313 0.5322 0.3795
4.5 Experiment Results
To validate the proposed OCA metric, nine standard test images (USC-SIPI, 2014), in-
cluding Elaine, F-16, F.B., House, Lenna, Mandrill, Peppers, S.L., Splash, as well as
the BSDS500 (Arbelàez et al., 2011) for JPEG images are considered. Unless specified
otherwise, the JPEG QF is set at 75.
4.5.1 OCA Score
Figure 4.6 shows the outline (edge and sketch) images generated by all eight outline
detectors considered and records the corresponding OCA scores. The outline detectors
include, in the order of left to right: (a) CAN, (b) SOB, (c) LOG, (d) SFE, (e) DCEC,
(f) INCC, (g) SAC, and (h) MBS. The outline image obtained with SFE always yields
the highest score among the outline detectors considered. In addition, the outline image
by SOB achieves the second highest score. The outline image by MBS always attains
the lowest scores because the outline images appear to be noisy. In the case of Mandrill
(i.e., last row) the outlines by CAN, SOB and LOG yield relatively low scores when
compared to other test images. It is because Mandrill is highly textured (e.g., consisting
of hair and beard), and hence it is technically challenging to distinguish between noise
and texture. Therefore, the proposed OCA yields lower scores for the outline images of
Mandril generated by CAN, SOB and LOG.
Table 4.4 records the average OCA scores for the two image datasets considered,
viz., standard test images and BSDS500. Results suggest that, for the BSDS500 dataset,
the OCA scores of CAN are lower than those of DCEC. It is because BSDS500 includes
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CAN SOB LOG SFE DCEC NCC SAC MBS
0.7358 0.8168 0.6887 0.9759 0.6412 0.4638 0.5203 0.2972
0.7854 0.8148 0.7469 0.9737 0.6460 0.5435 0.6063 0.3461
0.6783 0.7577 0.6329 0.9669 0.5827 0.5162 0.5223 0.3228
0.6945 0.7593 0.6677 0.9705 0.6417 0.5600 0.5872 0.3675
0.7472 0.8117 0.7199 0.9688 0.6215 0.5367 0.5537 0.3638
0.6447 0.6928 0.5679 0.9788 0.5688 0.5400 0.5371 0.3642
0.7576 0.8239 0.7414 0.9689 0.6467 0.5226 0.5542 0.3243
0.7366 0.7411 0.6721 0.9691 0.5651 0.5352 0.5388 0.3419
0.7316 0.8873 0.7101 0.9770 0.7433 0.4478 0.5873 0.2550
Figure 4.6: Outline images and the corresponding OCA scores for all nine standard test
images. From top to bottom: Elaine; F-16; F.B.; House; Lenna; Mandrill; Peppers; S.L.,
and; Splash
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(a) Original (b) CAN (c) DCEC
Figure 4.7: Original image #196073 from the BSDS500 dataset as well as outline images
by CAN edge detector and DCEC sketch attack
various complex images, hence, CAN outlines include many edge responses.
Figure 4.7 shows an image from BSDS500 with complex texture and its correspond-
ing outline images generated by CAN and DCEC. The outline image by CAN in Fig-
ure 4.7(b) consists of many edge regions, while the outline by DCEC in Figure 4.7(c)
shows only the outline of the main object (i.e., snake).
To demonstrate the textural dependency of the proposed assessment metric, the best
case (i.e., highest clearness outline image) and the worst case (i.e., lowest clearness out-
line image) scenarios of BSDS500 are shown in Figure 4.8 and 4.9, respectively. In the
best case scenario where the outlines are clear and visible, all outline images have high
OCA scores (i.e., > 0.65). On the other hand, in the worst case scenario, except for the
outline image generated by SOB and SFE, the outlines are blurred and hardly visible.
Based on the results attained from two datasets, it is concluded that the outline is
visible when OCA score ≥ 0.5.
4.5.2 Noise Sensitivity
To verify the sensitivity of the proposed OCA metric, two major distortions are consid-
ered, viz., JPEG compression and AGWN, which are the common distortions considered
to gauge image clearness/blurring/sharpness assessment metrics (Gu, Zhai, Lin, et al.,
2015; Guan et al., 2015; Q. Wu et al., 2015). Note that this chapter did not consider: (a)
JPEG2000 because it is not applicable for the sketch attacks considered in this work (i.e.,
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CAN SOB LOG SFE
0.9597 0.9579 0.9297 0.9901
DCEC INCC SAC MBS
0.9034 0.6834 0.8097 0.6858
Figure 4.8: Outline images and their OCA scores for image #135069 from BSDS500
(Best case scenario)
CAN SOB LOG SFE
0.3681 0.5742 0.3138 0.9297
DCEC INCC SAC MBS
0.4431 0.4138 0.3598 0.2594
Figure 4.9: Outline images and their OCA scores for image #8143 from BSDS500 (Worst
case scenario)
DCEC, INCC, SAC and MBS), and; (b) blurring because for the case of outline image, it
is irrelevant to consider the degree of sharpness (or blurring) of an outline image as long
as the outline is visible.
Specifically, for JPEG compression, the images in the BSDS500 dataset are encoded
into JPEG and then decoded for evaluation. Here, QF is set at 5, 10, 15, · · · , 95. To gen-
erate outline images, CAN (Canny, 1986), SOB (Gonzalez & Woods, 2006), LOG (Gon-
zalez & Woods, 2006) and SFE (Dollar & Zitnick, 2013) consider the pixel values in
the fully decoded images, while sketch attacks, DCEC, INCC, SAC and MBS, consider
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Figure 4.10: OCA scores of BSDS500 dataset for QF ∈ [5,95]
the partially decoded JPEG bitstream. The graph of OCA scores against QF are shown
in Figure 4.10. In general, the proposed OCA score increases steadily as QF increases
for CAN, LOG, SFE, DCEC, INCC, and SAC. However, the OCA scores for SOB and
MBS decrease as QF increases. It is because the outline by MBS is generated based on
the relative number of bits allocated to the blocks, but the number of bits spent on cod-
ing insignificant information (as opposed to the actual outline information) increases as
QF increases. In addition, SOB uses only simple first-order derivative filters, which is
sensitive to noise, and hence SOB fails to differentiate between the increased redundant
information and outline information. Similar trends are observed for the standard test
image and the results are omitted here.
Next, the OCA score is considered for the images in BSDS500 after applying AGWN
with ten standard deviations, viz., σw ∈{0, 0.012, 0.024, 0.048, 0.096, 0.125, 0.25, 0.5, 1,
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1.5}. Figure 4.11 shows the graph of OCA score against standard deviation in AGWN. It
is observed that the OCA scores drop significantly when σw of AGWN increases. Hence,
the proposed OCA metric is shown to be sensitive to AGWN. Similar trends are observed
for the standard test image and the results are omitted here.
Therefore, the proposed OCA metric is sensitive to very low or very high compres-
sion (quality) factors as well as AGWN. It is because these two factors significantly affect
the structural properties of any image.
In addition to above discussions, there are some limitations in this work. Although
the ideal outline images are provided in some datasets, they are not always available.
Therefore, in this chapter, it is assumed that the ideal outline image has only plain re-
gions and perceptible gradients. In other words, a formal definition of outline images is
inexistent. This may complicate the assessment of outline images, which is one of the
challenges in OCA. The proposed OCA metric may not be able to assess low-resolution
outline images, especially, sketch images, which are smaller in terms of image dimension
when compared to the input image. Specifically, the subsampling process in a multi-scale
analysis may produce an image that is too small, which is not suitable to describe the
outline information. Investing into handling low-resolution outline image will be done as
future work.
4.5.3 Comparison with Standard Image Quality Assessment
To further discuss the proposed OCA metric, in this section, the comparison with the
widely utilized metrics for image quality assessment metrics is discussed. In the litera-
ture, there are two major standard image quality metrics, namely: Pixel Signal-to-Noise
Ratio (PSNR), which measures the difference of pixel values between a target image and
a reference image; and SSIM, which measures the structural similarity of local parts be-
tween a target image and a reference image. Although both PSNR and SSIM indicate the
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Figure 4.11: OCA scores of BSDS500 dataset for various AGWN (QF = 75)
practical and objective quality of an image, they require a reference image. In addition,
they are designed for natural image. On the other hand, the proposed OCA can evaluate
sketch image without any reference image, and the OCA scores are found to match our
intuitive observation. Therefore, the proposed OCA metric is an appropriate metric for
evaluating outline/sketch image.
4.6 Summary
In this Chapter, a no-reference objective metric is proposed to assess the clearness of
outline images obtained from edge detectors or sketch attacks. Specifically, the image
entropy is exploited to quantify information in an outline image and SSIM is modified
into a feasible no-reference clearness metric. The product of these two scores is put
forward as an OCA metric. Results suggest that the proposed OCA metric can capture
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the outline clearness against compression and it is found to be sensitive to AGWN.
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CHAPTER 5: FORMAT-COMPLIANT SELECTIVE ENCRYPTION
FRAMEWORK FOR BLOCK-TRANSFORM COMPRESSED IMAGE
5.1 Overview
In this chapter, a general framework is put forward to realize format-compliant selective
encryption without bitstream expansion for block-transform compressed images. First, it
is discussed that some representative sketch attacks and the newly proposed sketch attack
are viable to conventional encryption methods. The proposed sketch attack is utilized
to design a format-compliant selective encryption operation. Then, the proposed opera-
tion and four encryption operations are augmented to form a complete format-compliant
selective encryption method for JPEG compressed image. This chapter ends with the dis-
cussion of the distortion, comparisons with conventional methods, and cryptanalysis, to
evaluate the performance of the proposed encryption framework.
5.2 Introduction
As aforementioned in Section 2.3, the demand increment of Megapixel (MP) images
are elevating the significance of practical security tools for compressed images. In the
literature, there are various approaches (Parvin et al., 2014; Subramanyam & Emmanuel,
2014; Tang et al., 2015) to encrypt raw uncompressed images, which can be classified
into two classes: Class (a) encryption then compression (Johnson et al., 2004), and; Class
(b) compression then encryption.
The latest encryption method (Zhou et al., 2014) of Class (a) achieves high compres-
sion efficiency, however, the output is not readily applicable to the existing standards such
as JPEG, which is the most widely deployed compression standard. In other words, the
method causes the same problem when the standard encryption methods (e.g., DES, AES,
or RSA) are applied to the image to encrypt, where the output is non-format compliant.
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Hence, format-compliant selective encryption methods are considered in this chapter.
In the literature, various format-compliant selective encryption methods (W. Li &
Yuan, 2007; Takayama et al., 2006; Wong & Tanaka, 2010; M. Zhang & Tong, 2014) have
been proposed to handle contents stored in the respective formats. However, the conven-
tional format-compliant selective encryption methods for compressed images cause se-
vere bitstream size overhead (W. Li & Yuan, 2007; Wong & Tanaka, 2010; M. Zhang &
Tong, 2014), because they improperly treat the components in contents. In addition, the
existing format-compliant selective encryption methods can not withstand to the sketch
attack (W. Li & Yuan, 2007).
Therefore, this chapter aims to achieve the following: (a) recommending basic re-
quirements in the design of format-compliant selective encryption method for block-
transform compressed images; (b) classifying transformed blocks into some groups to
make some regions based on the outline coarsely deduced directly from the non-DC co-
efficients (i.e., AC coefficients in JPEG compression form) to handle the DC coefficients,
and; (c) proposing a fully operational format-compliant selective encryption method for
JPEG compressed images.
5.3 Requirement for Encryption Framework
Recall that sketch image in Chapter 3 can represent outline image of the input image/video
frame, e.g., Figure 5.1(a) shows the DCEC image. Therefore, it is concluded that a viable
format-compliant selective encryption framework for block-transform compressed image
should take into account the following four requirements: (a) minimum bitstream size
overhead; (b) manipulation of the position or value of DC coefficients; (c) manipulation
of the number of nonzero AC coefficients in each block of the output (encrypted) image,
and; (d) Alternation of the energy of AC coefficients in each output block.
It is found that the conventional methods (W. Li & Yuan, 2007; Takayama et al.,
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2006; Wong & Tanaka, 2010; M. Zhang & Tong, 2014) satisfy the requirements (b-d),
i.e., withstand against sketch attacks using DC and AC coefficients at the expense of
requirement (a). On the other hand, the method (Niu et al., 2008) satisfies the requirement
(a), however, it fails the requirements of (b-d).
5.4 Proposed Sketch Attack for Grouping Blocks
The requirement of the bitstream size overhead minimization in Section 5.3 is a challeng-
ing task, because it is empirically found that handling DCT coefficient causes bitstream
size overhead due to entropy coding. To avoid the overhead, the operations of grouping
similar magnitude DC coefficients and handling them are considered in this chapter. To
group DC coefficients, a sketch image by a novel sketch attack, namely Energy of AC Co-
efficient Attack (EAC), is considered, because the sketch image empirically gives better
results in handling DC coefficients described in Section 5.5.1. Without loss of generality,
let g denote a grayscale image.
The EAC image φE is defined as follows:
φF(i, j) = round
(
255× e(i, j)
e¯
)
, (5.1)
where
e(i, j) =
(
8
∑
u=1
8
∑
v=1
|Fu,v(i, j)|
)
−|F1,1(i, j)|, (5.2)
where e(i, j) captures the strength of the edges/textures in the (i, j)-th 8×8 block, |Fu,v(i, j)|
denotes the absolute of Fu,v(i, j) and
e¯ =
1
M×N
M
∑
i=1
N
∑
j=1
e(i, j). (5.3)
Figure 5.1(b) shows the sketch image φE . The strength of the edges/textures, if any,
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(a) DCEC (b) EAC
Figure 5.1: Sketch images by applying the sketch attacks: (a) DCEC, and; (b) EAC to a
JPEG compressed image
founded in the block, can be represented by the energy of AC coefficients, where higher
AC energy suggests stronger edges/textures, and vice versa.
5.5 Proposed Encryption Framework
In this section, an encryption framework is proposed to encrypt images while satisfying
the four requirements. In the following sub-sections, the operation of rearranging the
DC coefficients is detailed, and then additional operations for format-compliant selective
encryption handling non-DC coefficients (i.e., AC) are also detailed to form a complete
format-compliant selective encryption method for JPEG compressed images. In addition,
the format-compliant selective decryption is also detailed.
5.5.1 Rearranging DC Coefficients (RDC)
In this section, a novel approach, namely RDC operation, is put forward to efficiently
encrypt the DC coefficients in a block-transform compressed image. The conventional
operations can be classified into either (a) shuffle the DC coefficients (W. Zeng & Lei,
2003); or (b) map the errors of DC coefficients to other different values in the same
category (Niu et al., 2008). However, methods in the class (a) result in bitstream size
overhead, while operations in class (b) are vulnerable to DCEC attack. Hence, to avoid
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Figure 5.2: Process flow of operations in RDC
these drawbacks of the conventional operations, the proposed operation is designed to
rearrange the DC coefficients, where distortion of the image quality and minimization of
bitstream size overhead are achieved simultaneously.
In the ideal case, when the DC coefficients are sorted in non-decreasing (or non-
increasing) order prior to the prediction process, the compression gain is maximized.
However, the sorting causes the location information loss of each DC coefficient and the
overhead for sorting the original locations is incurred. The overhead is far higher than the
compression gained by the sorting. Therefore, a sub-optimal approach is adopted in the
proposed operation without invoking the sorting process. The considered observations
in the idea of designing sub-optimal approach are as follows: (a) the intensity values of
pixels within an object (or a connected region) are relatively similar values (i.e., small
prediction error), and; (b) a DC coefficient value is the average intensity value of its
corresponding block.
Figure 5.2 shows the process flow of operations in Rearranging DC Coefficients
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(RDC). First, EAC is applied to the original (plaintext) image for obtaining its sketch
image, where the information of the number of nonzero AC coefficients in each block is
extracted by Equation 5.1. This operation is viable because the AC coefficients in each
block are still intact (i.e., not handled yet). Note that other sketch attacks in Chapter 3
are able to be utilized instead of EAC, but the same sketch attack must be used for during
format-compliant selective encryption and during reconstruction. Then, Otsu’s threshold-
ing method with the default parameter value of 0.5 (Otsu, 1979) is applied to the obtained
sketch image for generating a binary image. To separate weakly connected lines and
remove isolated points in the binary image, morphological operations, viz., erosion fol-
lowed by dilation of window size 3 × 3 pixels (i.e., opening operation), are applied to
the binary image. Then, a labeling operation (Robert & Linda, 1992) with 4-connectivity
is applied to the processed binary image. The DC coefficients of each labeled region
are extracted in the horizontal manner (i.e., left-to-right on odd row, right-to-left on even
row). To form a further processed queue, the extracted DC coefficients are sequentially
added to the queue. To avoid loss of generality, the regions are handled in ascending
order with respect to their labels. Last, to form rearranged DC coefficients, the queued
DC coefficients are sequentially extracted and added to the positions designed for the DC
coefficients in raster order.
Since this rearranging DC coefficient position doesn’t change DC coefficient values,
a format-compliant selective encryption withstanding significant bitstream size overhead
can be expected. However, the processed image by RDC still has a recognizable out-
line of the original image as shown in Figure 5.3(a). The result is expected the outcome
because the non-DC (i.e., AC) coefficients carry the textural/edge information of the orig-
inal image and they are unaltered. Therefore, the JPEG encoder is modified to include
encryption operations in the following sub-section for encryption the DC and AC coeffi-
cients during encoding. Note that the proposed format-compliant selective encryption is
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(a) Processed DC only (b) Encrypted image
Figure 5.3: Example of processed JPEG images
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Figure 5.4: Modified JPEG encoder
directly applicable to JPEG compressed images.
5.5.2 Encryption Method for JPEG
To perform entire format-compliant selective encryption operations, the JPEG encoder is
modified as shown in Figure 5.4. The modified encoder includes five format-compliant
selective encryption operations, viz., RDC (denoted as J1) and a conventional operation
for the DC (denoted as J2) and three conventional operations for the AC coefficients
(denoted as J3, J4, and J5), are consolidated for format-compliant selective encryption
method:
J1 RDC: The DC coefficients of an input image are rearranged in grouped regions
based on the labeled regions as described in Section 5.5.1. Note that the region
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labels can be shuffled further to withstand unauthorized reviewing or reconstruction
of the original image.
J2 DC Error Category Mapping: A bijective mapping method is applied to the each
predicted error to obtain a value from the same category as in (Niu et al., 2008).
The mapping method maintains the same sign of the predicted error, because ran-
domizing sign of the predicted error may cause underflow/overflow problem in a
general decoder. To generate encryption map for the predicted error, a secret key
k1 is considered.
J3 AC Sign Randomization: Each nonzero AC coefficient sign (i.e., −1/1) is multi-
plied with a pseudo-random sequence of −1’s and 1’s (Lian et al., 2007) using a
secret key k2.
J4 AC Block Shuffling: The blocks consisting only modified AC coefficients are then
globally shuffled using Equation (2.4) (Takayama et al., 2006) with the random per-
mutation map generated with a secret key k3. For example, B′AC(1,2) = BAC(1,3),
and so forth.
J5 AC ZRV Pair Shuffling: The ZRV pairs within each block are shuffled as in Refer-
ence (Takayama et al., 2006) using a secret key k4.
An example image (Lenna) encrypted with the proposed encryption method is shown
in Figure 5.3(b). It is found that the outline of Lenna is a completely unintelligible image,
hence the noise caused by both processing the DC and AC coefficients is sufficient to
distort images. Furthermore, the distortion strength level can be intensified by replacing
the entries of the quantization table with larger numbers for changing the pixel values (to
some very small/large values).
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Figure 5.5: ZRV pairs shuffling and block shuffling
To facilitate the understanding of the proposed format-compliant selective encryp-
tion operations, Figure 5.5 illustrates the operations of AC block shuffling and ZRV shuf-
fling. Specifically, Figure 5.5(a) shows the results of AC block shuffling (i.e., J4) for AC
blocks of size 32×32 pixels, where the numbers represent the indices for the AC blocks.
On the other hand, Figure 5.5(b) shows the output of shuffling ZRV pairs (i.e., J5) using
16, 0, 0, −3, 5, 6, 0, 0, 0, and −7 as the representative sequence of AC coefficients.
5.6 Decrypting Method for JPEG
In this section, the decryption operations to reconstruct the original image from its en-
crypted counterpart are described. Our modified JPEG decoder consisting five operations
is illustrated in Figure 5.6. The five operations, namely the two decryption operations
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Figure 5.6: Modified JPEG decoder
for the DC coefficients (denoted as D1 and D2) and the three format-compliant selective
decryption operations for the AC coefficients (denoted as D3, D4 and D5), are consoli-
dated for reversing the processes performed during format-compliant selective encryption
method:
D1 Inverse RDC: The DC coefficients of an encrypted image by the proposed encryp-
tion method are rearranged in the correct (original) locations using the connected
regions of the binary image deduced from the sketch image of the original image.
The inverse RDC will be detailed in the last paragraph of this section.
D2 DC Prediction Error Decryption: To obtain the correct (original) value, each the
encrypted DC prediction error is remapped by using the same key k1 as in the
modified encoder for format-compliant selective encryption.
D3 AC Sign Reconstruction: To reconstruct each correct (original) sign, the correct
pseudo-randomly generated a sequence of −1’s and 1’s (Lian et al., 2007) by using
k2 is multiplied to the sign of each decoded nonzero AC coefficient.
D4 AC Block Reconstruction: The correct position blocks (consisting of AC compo-
nents only) are reconstructed as in (Takayama et al., 2006) with the correct index
generated by k3.
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Figure 5.7: Process flow of inverse RDC coefficients
D5 AC ZRV Pair Decryption: ZRV pairs within a block are decrypted as in Refer-
ence (Takayama et al., 2006) using k4.
Unlike the format-compliant selective encryption method, the AC coefficients are
processed first, and the reconstructed blocks of AC coefficients are utilized to obtain
regions deduced from the sketch image of the original image for restoring the positions
of the DC coefficients. Specifically, the decryption process follows the flow order of D5,
D4, D3, D2, and then D1.
Figure 5.7 shows the inverse RDC operation flow after completely reconstructing AC
coefficients, where the connected regions deduced from the sketch image are utilized to
restore the DC coefficients. Specifically, first the AC coefficients are fully reconstructed
(i.e., operation D5, D4, and D3), the sketch image of the image is obtained by using the
same sketch attack (i.e., either INCC or EAC) as in the modified encoder. Then, the
regions in the binary image deduced from the sketch image are grouped and labeled in
the same manner as in the modified encoder. The DC coefficients of each region are
sequentially reserved in a fixed length queue. Specifically, starting from label index 1, the
DC coefficients are extracted in the raster scan order and put in the queue. When a queue
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becomes full with DC coefficients, the following DC coefficients are put in the sequential
queues with label indices 2, 3, and so forth until DC coefficients are processed. Finally,
by using the order of left-to-right on odd rows and right-to-left on even rows, the queues
of DC coefficients are de-queued to fill each labeled region.
5.7 Experiment Results and Discussions
To verify the performance of the proposed format-compliant selective encryption, the
method is implemented using the reference software (Group’s, 2012) and two datasets,
i.e., nine standard test images (USC-SIPI, 2014) and the SIMPLIcity image dataset (Z. J. Wang
et al., 2001) are considered, respectively, where the nine standard test images are in
grayscale with the size of 512×512 pixels each (i.e., Elaine, F-16, F.B. , House, Lenna,
Mandrill, Peppers, S.L., and Splash) and the SIMPLIcity image dataset consists of 1000
images (i.e., mixture of building, human, coast, train, animal, flower, etc) with the size of
256×384 pixels. In addition, to generate pseudo-random numbers, Mersenne Twister (Mat-
sumoto & Nishimura, 1998) is utilized with a 32-bit seed.
The experiment results generated by the proposed JPEG format-compliant encryp-
tion method are discussed in the following sub-sections. To avoid loss of generality, the
parameter of QF is fixed at 75 and all QT values are set to 255. First, the results in terms
of distortion are presented in Section 5.7.1. Next, the comparison results among the pro-
posed and conventional encryption methods are discussed in terms of robustness against
sketch attacks and bitstream size overhead in Section 5.7.2. Then, security analysis is
verified in Section 5.7.3. Last, the limitation of the proposed method is summarized in
Section 5.7.4.
5.7.1 Distortion
The nine original images and the corresponding output images generated by the proposed
format-compliant selective encryption method are shown in Figure 5.8, respectively. It
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(a) Elaine (b) F-16 (c) F.B.
(d) House (e) Lenna (f) Mandrill
(g) Peppers (h) S.L. (i) Splash
Figure 5.8: Original images and outputs of the proposed encryption method for various
JPEG compressed images
Table 5.1: SSIM and PSNR (dB) of output images generated by the proposed method
Image SSIM PSNR (dB)
Elaine 0.1100 6.1808
F-16 0.1205 5.4378
F.B. 0.0624 6.1711
House 0.0668 5.8528
Lenna 0.0903 6.1316
Mandrill 0.0227 6.3116
Peppers 0.0866 6.3002
S.L. 0.0495 5.9968
Splash 0.1882 5.6295
SIMPLIcity 0.0779 5.8275
is clearly found that the proposed method transforms each image into an unintelligible
image regardless of its original texture/edge. To quantify the obtained distortion level,
the SSIM (Z. Wang et al., 2004) and PSNR Decibel (dB) values of the encrypted images
are recorded in the second and third columns of Table 5.1, respectively. Results suggest
that SSIM and PSNR dB values are very low, in other words, the encrypted images by the
proposed encryption method are significantly distorted.
To proof of the concept, the encrypted Lenna images using various QF ∈ {5, 15,
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(a) QF = 5 (b) QF = 15 (c) QF = 35
(d) QF = 55 (e) QF = 75 (f) QF = 95
Figure 5.9: Encrypted Lenna images for various JPEG quality factors
35, 55, 75, 95} are shown in Figure 5.9, where QF = 5 and 95 represent the low and
high fidelity images, respectively. The encrypted images are unintelligible, hence results
suggest that the proposed encryption method is viable to perceptually distort the images
compressed with different QFs. It is found that the distortion becomes more stronger
when QF increases, because high fidelity image generally has more nonzero coefficients,
which directly contribute to the appearance/distortion of the image. Similar results of
other test images are also obtained.
5.7.2 Comparisons with Conventional Methods
In this section, the performances (i.e., spatial correlation, sketch attack robustness and
bitstream size overhead) of the proposed method is compared with those of the conven-
tional format-compliant selective encryption methods (W. Li & Yuan, 2007; Niu et al.,
2008; Takayama et al., 2006; Wong & Tanaka, 2010). As shown in Figure 5.10, the
considered methods are viable to distort the compressed image into completely unintel-
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(a) Reference (W. Li & Yuan, 2007) (b) Reference (Takayama et al., 2006)
(c) Reference (Wong & Tanaka, 2010) (d) Proposed method
Figure 5.10: Distorted images for the test image Lenna encrypted by all format-compliant
selective encryption methods considered (QF = 95)
ligible form, therefore the comparison in terms of image quality is omitted. Here, the
Reference (M. Zhang & Tong, 2014) is not considered since the method causes severe
bitstream size overhead (i.e., > 50%).
First, spatial correlations between neighboring pixels of the encrypted images are
considered. Generally, format-compliant selective encryption methods are designed to
conceal the perceptual information of the original image, in other words, the encryption
methods destroy the correlation among pixels. Therefore, lower spatial correction in any
direction implies better performance of encryption. The spatial correlation value ωPO can
be obtained as follows:
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ωPQ =
E[(p−µP)(o−µO)]
σPσO
, (5.4)
where E is the expectation function, O is the set of pixel values in g, µO is the mean pixel
value of the input image g, and σO is the variance of the pixel values in g. P, µP and σP are
defined similarly for the shifted image gα . Here, gα assumes the values of hor ghor(x,y),
ver gver(x,y), dia gdia(x,y), denoting the direction of right, bottom and diagonal (i.e.,
bottom-right), respectively. Specifically, the shifted image gα is constructed as follows:
ghor(x,y) = g(x,y+1) (5.5)
gver(x,y) = g(x+1,y) (5.6)
gdia(x,y) = g(x+1,y+1) (5.7)
where 1≤ x ≤ X and 1≤ y ≤ Y .
Table 5.2 shows the spatial correlation values for the horizontal, vertical and diag-
onal directions, where Original denotes that no encryption operations are applied to the
input image, namely the output is the original image. Results suggest that the original
image yields the highest correlation value in any directions, and the proposed method
yields the lowest correlation value among the considered format-compliant selective en-
cryption methods. Therefore, from destroying spatial correlation point of view, the pro-
posed method is able to outperform the considered format-compliant selective encryption
methods.
Next, the comparison of the robustness against sketch attack among the considered
methods is considered. Only (Niu et al., 2008) is vulnerable to the sketch attacks con-
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Table 5.2: Spatial correlation in the horizontal, vertical and diagonal directions (using
Lenna compressed at QF = 75 as the test image)
Method Horizontal Vertical Diagonal
Original 0.9737 0.9868 0.9609
Proposed 0.3811 0.3802 0.2697
W. Li & Yuan (2007) 0.6102 0.6495 0.4485
Takayama et al. (2006) 0.8459 0.8590 0.7302
Wong & Tanaka (2010) 0.5710 0.6206 0.3941
sidered, while the rest are able to withstand them (i.e., DCEC, INCC, and EAC). It is
because (Niu et al., 2008) changes neither the category nor the position of the DC coeffi-
cients, in other words, requirement (a) is satisfied. Therefore, when DCEC is applied to
the Lenna image encrypted by (Niu et al., 2008), an output similar to Figure 5.1(a) can
be obtained. On the other hand, (W. Li & Yuan, 2007; Takayama et al., 2006; Wong &
Tanaka, 2010) and the proposed encryption method are robust against the sketch attacks
considered because they satisfy the requirement (b-d).
Last, the bitstream size overhead by encryption is considered, Table 5.3 shows the
bitstream size overhead of the encrypted images by the considered methods, where the
results for (Niu et al., 2008) is not recorded because they are always near to zero. Results
clearly show that the considered conventional methods (W. Li & Yuan, 2007; Takayama
et al., 2006; Wong & Tanaka, 2010) suffer from bitstream size overhead. Specifically,
Reference (W. Li & Yuan, 2007) induces severe bitstream size overhead, i.e., ∼ +20%
of the original image. On the other hand, Reference (Niu et al., 2008) and the proposed
method are viable to suppress bitstream size overhead, where their overhead are signifi-
cantly lower than those of the other considered methods (W. Li & Yuan, 2007; Takayama
et al., 2006; Wong & Tanaka, 2010). The overhead of the proposed method and the con-
sidered methods (W. Li & Yuan, 2007; Takayama et al., 2006; Wong & Tanaka, 2010)
are, on average, +0.032%, +3.518%, +19.770%, and +11.955%, respectively. Note
that similar trends are observed for other QF values. Figure 5.11 shows the average bit-
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Figure 5.11: Graph of average bitstream size overhead against quality factor for the
SIMPLIcity dataset
stream size overhead for various QFs with the SIMPLIcity dataset (Z. J. Wang et al.,
2001). It is clearly found that the proposed encryption method stably suppresses the bit-
stream size overhead (i.e., +0%) for all QFs considered, while the conventional methods
cause different results.
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Recall that (Niu et al., 2008) is able to suppress the bitstream size overhead, but it
is vulnerable to the sketch attack DCEC. On the other hand, methods (W. Li & Yuan,
2007; Takayama et al., 2006; Wong & Tanaka, 2010) can withstand the considered sketch
attacks at the expense of bitstream size overhead. Therefore, it is concluded that the
proposed method is able to achieve outperformed-balanced performance which is the
robustness against sketch attack as well as minimizing bitstream size overhead.
5.7.3 Cryptanalysis
In this sub-section, the robustness of the proposed encryption method against conven-
tional cryptanalysis is analyzed. By attacking, it is assumed that the adversary does not
have the keys used during encryption when given only an encrypted image.
In terms of cryptanalysis, a format-compliant selective encryption method is called
robust if the number of all trial combinations is infeasible to reconstruct the original image
from the encrypted image, which approach is referred to as the plaintext only (i.e., brute
force) attack in the literature. To avoid loss of generality, let n(i, j) denote the number
of nonzero AC coefficients in the (i, j)-th 8× 8 block in a JPEG compressed image and
θ denote the number of regions deduced from the sketch image considered in RDC. The
total number of possible combinations for each process (i.e., τ(J1), τ(J2), τ(J3), τ(J4)
and τ(J5)) is listed as follows:
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θ ! combinations for region labels : τ(J1)
15
∏
κ=0
(
2κ
2
)
! combinations for DC errors categories : τ(J2)
2χ combinations for AC sign information : τ(J3)
(M×N)! combinations for block shuffling : τ(J4),
M
∏
i=1
N
∏
j=1
(n(i, j))! combinations for ZRV pairs : τ(J5)
where κ denotes the number of categories and χ = ∑Mi=1∑
N
j=1 n(i, j). An adversary need
to consider ∏5l=1τ(Jl) difference combinations in total when performing the brute force
attack. The number is significantly large. Specifically, when each block has at least one
nonzero AC coefficient, here are at least 1024! combinations for τ(J4) itself for M = N
= 32. Therefore, the proposed encryption method is robust against the brute force (i.e.,
plaintext only) attack.
Next, the chosen-plaintext attack scenario where the adversary has access to the cor-
responding encrypted image for any input image, is considered. The chosen-plaintext
attack aims to determine the permutation and mapping operations by tracing the elements
(e.g., coefficients) in the images before and after encryption. If it is infeasible to trace the
elements of the input image and encrypted images by format-compliant selective encryp-
tion method, the encryption method is regarded as a robust against the chosen-plaintext
attack. Note that, in the proposed format-compliant selective encryption method, the
processes that handle DC and AC coefficients depend on the texture of the image. Specif-
ically, the locations of DC coefficients are rearranged into regions deduced by the AC
coefficients. In addition, the AC components in each block are shuffled in a manner such
that (a) the nonzero AC coefficients are shuffled within each block, and (b) the AC blocks
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are shuffled globally. Furthermore, the Huffman codewords for ZRV pairs can be bijec-
tively mapped to other codewords with the same length, which reconstructs a different
visual image. Hence, the aforementioned operations with the proposed format-compliant
selective encryption method, which depends on the texture of the plaintext image, as
well as the mapping of AC coefficients, are able to generate the huge combination num-
ber of DCT coefficients (DC and AC) between before and after encryption process. In
other words, there is no straightforward way to trace the DCT coefficients in the corre-
sponding plaintext and ciphertext images. Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed
format-compliant selective encryption withstands the chosen-plaintext attack.
5.7.4 Discussions
The experiments were conducted on JPEG compressed grayscale images from the stan-
dard test images from USC-SIPI (USC-SIPI, 2014) and SIMPLIcity image dataset (Z. J. Wang
et al., 2001). Color images from databases such as BSDS500 (Arbelàez et al., 2011) may
be considered and they can be applied to the proposed encryption method by separately
considering both luminance and chrominance channels (i.e., Y, Cb, and Cr). However,
there is no commonly accepted quality metrics for color images, which have a similar
reputation of either SSIM or PSNR for grayscale images. Therefore, the measured distor-
tion caused by a format-compliant selective encryption may not be conclusive.
On the other hand, as an extension of application, the proposed encryption method
can be applicable to the images compressed in other recent image compression form such
as JPEG Extend Range (JPEG-XR), which includes three subbands coefficient values.
However, the property of the three subbands may require analysis and redesign to meet the
proposed four requirements in Section 5.3. In addition, the proposed encryption method
also can be directly applicable to the I-frame in older generations of video compres-
sion standard (e.g., MPEG-1/2). However, manipulating motion compensated frames and
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handling INTRA predicted blocks in recent standards such as H.264 and H.265 (H.264/5)
require further analysis and effort to minimize bitstream size overhead while ensuring
robustness against possible sketch attacks as well as classical cryptanalysis.
The aforementioned limitations and extensions will be pursued as future work.
5.8 Summary
In this Chapter, an encryption framework is proposed to design format-compliant selec-
tive encryption methods while aiming to minimize bitstream size overhead, which is a
problem of current encryption methods. Specifically, a newly proposed sketch attack is
considered to classify DC coefficients into some groups. The mechanism of these sketch
attacks is utilized in the proposed framework to rearrange the DC coefficients for mini-
mizing bitstream size overhead, which is also a problem of current encryption methods.
Then, the proposed framework was augmented with various operations to form a com-
plete format-compliant selective encryption method for JPEG images.
Experiment results verified that the proposed encryption method can severely de-
grade the quality of a JPEG compressed image while achieving smaller bitstream size
overhead with more stable performance when compared to the conventional JPEG en-
cryption methods. In addition, the proposed encryption method survives all sketch attacks
considered, brute-force attack, as well as chosen-plaintext attack.
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CHAPTER 6: TEXT DETECTION IN H.264/AVC COMPRESSED VIDEO
6.1 Overview
Multi-oriented text detection in compressed videos is a challenging task because the pix-
els are significantly de-correlated for efficient compression purpose. In this chapter, a
novel fusion based multi-oriented text detection method in I-frame of H.264/AVC com-
pressed video is proposed to demonstrate an application of the proposed sketch attacks in
Chapter 2. The proposed text detection method utilizes four feature entities, each based
on the sum of absolute value of judiciously selected AC coefficients. These extracted fea-
ture entities are fused into an image, which is, in turn, processed by Gaussian smoothing
filter and clustered by k-means. Morphological operations are then applied to refine the
output. Experiment results show that the proposed text detection method outperforms the
conventional methods considered.
6.2 Introduction
As surveyed in Section 2.5, texts contained in a video include much information related
the video, hence text detection is the most crucial step for video applications, i.e., video
indexing and retrieval (J. Zhang & Kasturi, 2008; Jung et al., 2004). As of the writing of
this thesis, there is only a paper (X. Qian et al., 2012) that proposed text detection method
in H.264/AVC compressed video, which is the most successfully deployed video coding
standard. However, this text detection method depends on threshold values for text block
verification and it targets on graphics text of horizontal direction only but not scene text
of arbitrary orientation.
Hence, in this chapter, a novel fusion method is proposed for detecting both graphics
and scene multi-oriented text in H.264/AVC compressed video regardless of its scripts,
font type and font size, which is a shift of paradigm from the conventional methods. The
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proposed method utilizes four feature entities, each considering the sum of the absolute
value of judiciously selected AC coefficients. These four feature entities are fused into an
image to enhance edge contrast of the frame. The image is then classified into text and
non-text regions by using k-means clustering. The text candidate regions are processed by
morphological operations to remove noise. The processed image is considered to decide
on the text regions. Experiments are carried out to verify the basic performance of the
proposed method.
6.3 Proposed Fusion Based Multi-Oriented Text Detection
Qian et al. (X. Qian et al., 2012) only consider the sum of the absolute of AC coefficients
and yet promising performance in text detection is achieved. In the same year, Roy et
al. (Roy et al., 2012) enhance image contrast by proposing the multi-spectrum fusion
method, which integrates wavelet and gradient information. Motivated by these methods,
the fusion concept in (Roy et al., 2012) is improved for text detection in H.264/AVC
compressed video by defining the feature entities directly in the compressed bitstream.
The proposed fusion based text detection method consists of five parts, including (a)
computing four feature entities; (b) fusing four feature entities into an image; (c) Gaussian
filtering, (d) k-means clustering, and; (e) morphological operations. Figure 6.1 shows the
process flow of the proposed method, where the input is transformed coefficients of each
block in an H.264/AVC compressed video and the output is the detected text regions.
6.3.1 Motivation for Text Detection in H.264/AVC Video
Recall that sketch in Section 2.5.2 suggests that edge information can be extracted directly
from the compressed domain. Results of the sketch images in Chapter 3 also suggest that
sketch image is viable to represent the outline of the I-frame in H.264/AVC compressed
video. In addition, video contents are generally stored the in compressed form, where the
H.264/AVC standard is currently the most successfully deployed video coding standard.
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Figure 6.1: Flow diagram of the proposed text detection method
Since text in a video provide significant information about the video in question, it is
justifiable to realize text detection directly in the compressed form without full decoding.
Furthermore, H.264/AVC performs IntDCT on the raw pixel and residual informa-
tion, where IntDCT is also deployed in the latest video coding standard called HEVC (Sul-
livan et al., 2012). Hence, text detection in the IntDCT domain is a practical direction with
potential future uses and is expected to reduce the computational cost because only partial
decoding is required.
6.3.2 Four Feature Entities
Recall that Fu,v(i, j) is defined in Equation 2.1 as the (u,v)-th transformed and quantized
coefficient value of the (i, j)-th γ × γ block in T. In this chapter, the (u,v)-th absolute
values of Fu,v(i, j) are considered to extract the four feature entities. The absolute value
Au,v(i, j) can be expressed as follows:
Au,v(i, j) = |Fu,v(i, j)|. (6.1)
In addition, the block size of 4× 4 pixels is considered in the proposed method
because this size is available in the BP (Wiegand et al., 2003). However, the higher
frequency AC coefficients are usually of small magnitude due to quantization process. To
utilize feature entries equally, normalization and rounding each quantity are considered.
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First, the four feature quantities are defined as following sub-sections.
6.3.2.1 AC Coefficients with Vertical Information
The vertical entry (φver) is defined by considering AC coefficients with vertical informa-
tion as follows:
φver(i, j) = round
(
255× λV (i, j)
max{λV (i, j)}
)
, (6.2)
where
λV (i, j) =
4
∑
v=2
A1,v(i, j), (6.3)
where round (·) rounds the real value to an 8-bit unsigned integer in the range of [0,255]
and λV (i, j) is the sum of absolute vertical AC coefficients.
6.3.2.2 AC Coefficients with Horizontal Information
The horizontal entry (φhor) is defined by considering AC coefficients with horizontal in-
formation as follows:
φhor(i, j) = round
(
255× λH(i, j)
max{λH(i, j)}
)
, (6.4)
where the sum of absolute horizontal AC coefficients λH(i, j) is defined as follows,
λH(i, j) =
4
∑
u=2
Au,1(i, j). (6.5)
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6.3.2.3 AC Coefficients with Diagonal Information
The diagonal entry (φdia) is defined by considering AC coefficients with diagonal infor-
mation as follows:
φDia(i, j) = round
(
255× λD(i, j)
max{λD(i, j)}
)
, (6.6)
where the sum of absolute diagonal AC coefficients λD(i, j) is defined as follows,
λD(i, j) =
3
∑
u=2
3
∑
v=2
Au,v(i, j). (6.7)
6.3.2.4 AC Coefficients with Complexity Information
The complex entry (φcom) is defined by considering complexity measure as follows:
φcom(i, j) = round
(
255× λC(i, j)
max{λC(i, j)}
)
, (6.8)
where the sum of absolute complexity AC coefficients λC(i, j) is defined as follows,
λC(i, j) =
3
∑
u=2
A4,v(i, j)+
(
3
∑
v=2
Au,4(i, j)
)
+A4,4. (6.9)
Figure 6.2 shows the images generated by the feature entities for an oriented text image.
6.3.3 Text Candidates Selection
To obtain a high contrast image for facilitating text detection, the maximum values among
the four feature entities (viz., φver, φhor, φdia and φcom) are selected and fused into an image
φT as follows:
φT (i, j) = max{φver(i, j),φhor(i, j),φdia(i, j),φcom(i, j)} . (6.10)
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(a) φver: Vertical information (b) φhor: Horizontal information
(c) φdia: Diagonal information (d) φcom: Complexity information
Figure 6.2: Four feature entities for oriented text
Figure 6.3(a) and (b) show the fused images for horizontal and oriented texts. Here, the
fused images are first filtered by using Gaussian smoothing filter. Second, the text can-
didates are classified into the text and non-text regions. Then, morphological operations,
specifically, 3× 3 close and open filtering, are applied to the text regions. The refined
text regions ΩR are shown in Figure 6.4(a) and (b), where the clustered text regions are
apparent for both horizontal and oriented texts.
6.4 Experiment Results and Discussions
The proposed text detection method is implemented in H.264/AVC using the reference
software (Tourapis Michael et al., 2009) for partial decoding and Matlab for detecting
text. Here, two datasets are considered, each consisting of graphics and/or scene text.
Specifically, Dataset1 contains 100 images of sizes ranging from 352×240 to 816×448
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(a) Horizontal (b) Oriented
Figure 6.3: Fused output for horizontal and oriented text
(a) Graphics horizontal (b) Scene oriented
Figure 6.4: Refined results
pixels, each with horizontal text. Dataset2 contains 100 images each of size 352× 240
pixels with oriented text. These images are first encoded as an I-frame using the BP and
decoded for detection purpose. In the following sub-sections, the results generated by the
proposed fusion based method are presented.
6.4.1 Accuracy Performance
Two spatial domain methods (Shivakumara et al., 2010; C. Liu et al., 2005) and the latest
H.264/AVC compressed domain method (X. Qian et al., 2012) are considered for com-
parison. Figure 6.5(a-d) show the output generated by the conventional methods and the
proposed method for detecting horizontal text. It demonstrates that text lines are detected
by all methods considered. Figure 6.6(a-d) shows an example of the output for oriented
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(a) Reference (C. Liu et al., 2005) (b) Reference (Shivakumara et al., 2010)
(c) Reference (X. Qian et al., 2012) (d) Proposed
Figure 6.5: Representative output for horizontal text
text. It is apparent that the existing methods failed to detect oriented text line because
they are designed to detect horizontal text only, in which case the oriented text regions
are removed as false positives or merged as horizontal text regions. Hence, some detected
regions include false positives. On the other hand, the proposed method could detect the
oriented text. To quantify the performance, manual counting of lines, i.e., correct and not
correct, is performed, and then the resulting counted number is compared with the ground
truth data. Here, three scores are considered, viz., Precision (“Number of correct lines"
/ “number of collected lines"), Recall (“Number of correct lines" / “ground truth"), and
F−measure (2×Precision×Recall/(Precision+Recall)).
To further justify the proposed method, one more method utilizing only φcom (com-
plexity information) is considered. Table 6.1 compares the scores of each method for
both image datasets. For dataset1, the scores of φcom are less than those of the proposed
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(a) Reference (C. Liu et al., 2005) (b) Reference (Shivakumara et al., 2010)
(c) Reference (X. Qian et al., 2012) (d) Proposed
Figure 6.6: Representative output for oriented text
method. However, for dataset2, the scores of φcom dropped significantly because oriented
text is assumed different features, which are not considered by φcom. Results verify that
the proposed method can exploit the feature entities in H.264/AVC for text detection. For
Dataset1, References (Shivakumara et al., 2010; X. Qian et al., 2012) achieve higher pre-
cision than the proposed method, but suffer from low recall. These results suggest that the
proposed method is more robust than the conventional methods in terms of text detection
in video. For Dataset2, the existing methods suffer from very low recall, because the text
candidates are removed by their refinement processes, i.e., bounding box size in Refer-
ences (Shivakumara et al., 2010; C. Liu et al., 2005) and projection in Reference (X. Qian
et al., 2012). These results suggest that the proposed text detection method is superior in
detecting oriented text while maintaining its performance for horizontal text.
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6.4.2 Computation Complexity
In this section, computational complexity is discussed. For methods in the spatial domain,
the total execution time from decoding the H.264/AVC compressed video to obtaining the
detected text regions is collected. Table 6.2 compares the execution time of each method
for both datasets, where m and s refer to minutes and seconds, respectively. Here, each
method is executed on MacBook Pro (Retina, 13-inch, Mid 2014). As expected, the meth-
ods based on compressed domain yield less execution times than methods operating in the
spatial domain. However, due to its complexity, i.e., computation of features and fusion
parts, the proposed method executes slower than Qian’s method (X. Qian et al., 2012).
Nonetheless, it still executes faster than the considered spatial domain based methods.
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All in all, the proposed method is robust because it yields stable performance for
detecting horizontal and oriented texts. Also, as mentioned in Section 6.4.1, the pro-
posed method achieves higher accuracy than the latest method in the H.264/AVC com-
pressed domain for the datasets considered. Furthermore, results suggest that the pro-
posed method requires shorter execution time when compared to those in the spatial
domain. Hence, the proposed text detection method is practical for text detection in
H.264/AVC compressed video.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter, a novel fusion based text detection method is proposed to detect graph-
ics and scene texts in H.264/AVC compressed videos. Text candidate lines are formed
by fusing the proposed four feature entities computed directly from the AC coefficients.
Results suggest that the proposed method outperforms the latest text detection method
in the H.264/AVC compressed video for detecting graphics and scene texts of multi-
orientations.
As future work, to improve precision, small false positive regions should be removed
by considering entities in H.264/AVC compressed video, while suppressing the compu-
tational cost. Furthermore, exploring the performance, i.e., precision, recall, F-measure,
on more datasets including text-frame and non-text frame, is necessary for practical ap-
plications. Implementation of real-time applications for text detection in H.264/AVC and
HEVC compressed videos will be further pursued.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
In the last chapter, the research outcome of this study is summarized in the form of con-
tributions made, particularly in feature extraction in the compressed domain. Next, since
this study conducted under assumptions, therefore the limitations of this study are pre-
sented. Finally, future works and possible directions for applications by using the pro-
posed extracted features in the compressed domain are discussed.
7.1 Summary
Five feature extraction methods, i.e., sketch attacks are proposed to generate outline in-
formation directly from block transform compressed images/videos. Then, an outline
clearness assessment metric is put forward to evaluate the sketch images by considering
both the global and local features. Next, a format-compliant selective encryption method
for block transform images is presented, where the transformed coefficients are manipu-
lated and processed based on the sketched image. Next, as an application of sketch image,
text detection directly in the compressed video is demonstrated. Finally, the contributions,
limitations, and future works, as well as possible directions of this study are presented.
7.2 Contributions
This study has achieved its objectives as follows:
1. Five sketch attacks, namely, DCEC, INCC, PLZ, SAC, and MBS, are put forward
to extract an outline of video frame/image directly from H.264/AVC compressed
videos and JPEG image encrypted by the current state-of-art format-compliant
video/image encryption methods in Chapter 3.
2. A no-reference assessment metric is proposed by considering image entropy and
spatial correlation to evaluate clearness of the outline image. Then, the obtained
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sketch images are evaluated using the proposed assessment metric in Chapter 4
3. Recommendations on the design of format-compliant selective encryption for block
transform based visual content are put forward. A rearrangement operation of
DC coefficients, i.e., RDC, is proposed in Chapter 5. Next, a complete format-
compliant selective encryption method for JPEG compressed image is formed by
augmenting the proposed RDC with some conventional encryption operations to
mask the AC coefficients.
4. The application of multi-oriented text detection is demonstrated by utilizing fea-
tures from four proposed sketch attacks and the proposed fusion process in Chap-
ter 6
7.3 Limitations
Although promising results were achieved, the proposed methods of this study have fol-
lowing limitations:
1. Generally, the resolution of a sketch image is much smaller than that of the original
counterpart, and the sizes depend on the block transform window size and the size
of macroblock size in a compression standard. The reduction in size of each sketch
attack is reported in the second column of Table 7.1. In addition, since each sketch
attack focus on a specific feature in the compressed domain, when the specific fea-
ture is significantly modified during encryption, a sketch attack may fail to sketch
outline of the original video frame/image directly from the encrypted content. The
third column of Table 7.1 records the corresponding features.
2. Literature survey carried out in this study suggests that there is no common agree-
ment on ideal outline images and its evaluation, particularly for non-reference as-
sessment. To address this problem, the proposed no-reference OCA metric is pro-
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Table 7.1: Limitation of sketch attacks in compressed domain
Sketch image Resolution Exploited feature
φD 1/γ The category of residue DC coefficients
φN 1/γ The number of nonzero AC coefficients
φP 1/γ The position of last nonzero AC coefficients
φS 1/γ Sum of absolute AC coefficients
φE 1/γ Modified sum of absolute AC coefficients
φT 1/γ Fused four entities of selected AC coefficients
φB 1/δ The bits allocated to each MB
where γ is block transform window size and δ is the MB size.
posed, but it is based on empirical experiments and the observations. Therefore,
the proposed no-reference OCA metric may be limited to the considered outline
detectors and sketch attacks in this study.
3. The assumed encryption issues in this study, namely, bitstream size suppression and
robust security against cryptanalysis and sketch attacks are solved by the proposed
format-compliant encryption method. However, the proposed encryption frame-
work may not be applicable to the newer/future compression standards, such as
JPEG-XR, unless major redesigning takes place. It is because the newer compres-
sion standards employ adaptive entropy coding, where encryption may cause sig-
nificant bitstream size overhead.
4. Although the proposed fusion based text detection method in Chapter 6 can detect
multi-oriented text regions, it can only detect at the block size (i.e., restricted to the
block size of 4×4), which is determined by the standard. Hence, it is a challenging
task to outperform the conventional text detection methods in the non-compressed
domain.
7.4 Future Works
Recall that, by utilizing some information about the used encryption method, appropriate
sketch attack(s) can be launched to generate better sketch image(s) than just applying
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sketch attack(s) one by one. More specifically, statistical analysis is conducted to obtain
the information of better distribution of components, and then the component(s) with
better distribution is(are) utilized for sketch attack.
In addition, the contributions of this study can be extended to design applications of
multimedia content management tools, including, encryption, and text detection. Specif-
ically, sketch image, which is a set of contour lines, can be utilized to realize application
based on outline, e.g., human action recognition (Tom et al., 2015), moving object seg-
mentation, etc.
Furthermore, assessment for the extracted features via sketch attack is still immature
because this study proposes the first non-reference evaluation. A potential approach to
justify the consistency of the proposed assessment metric is to perform automated image
retrieval based on the extracted features using some well-labelled datasets.
Last but not least, the concept of sketch attack can be extended to the state-of-art
block transform based compression technologies, including, JPEG-XR for still images,
and HEVC for videos. Since the latest compression standards remove redundancy signif-
icantly, it is necessary to redesign sketch attack to efficiently and effectively extract the
remaining information in the compressed contents (in the form of bitstream) as a feature
extraction process in the compressed domain.
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Applications (Accepted).
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